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Abstract
We introduce a new approach to the study of influence in strategic settings where
the action of an individual depends on that of others in a network-structured way. We
propose influence games (IGs) as a game-theoretic (GT) model of the behavior of a
large but finite networked population. IGs allow both positive and negative influence
factors, permitting reversals in behavioral choices. We embrace pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium (PSNE), an important solution concept in non-cooperative game theory, to
formally define the stable outcomes of an IG and to predict potential outcomes without
explicitly considering intricate dynamics. We address an important problem in net-
work influence, the identification of the most influential individuals, and approach it
algorithmically using PSNE computation. Computationally, we provide (a) complexity
characterizations of various problems on IGs; (b) efficient algorithms for several special
cases and heuristics for hard cases; and (c) approximation algorithms, with provable
guarantees, for the problem of identifying the most influential individuals. Experi-
mentally, we evaluate our approach using both synthetic IGs and real-world settings
of general interest, each corresponding to a separate branch of the U.S. Government.
Mathematically, we connect IGs to important GT models: potential and polymatrix
games.
Keywords: Computational Game Theory, Social Network Analysis, Influence in Social
Networks, Nash Equilibrium, Computational Complexity
1 Introduction
The influence of an entity on its peers is a commonly noted phenomenon in both online
and real-life social networks. In fact, there is growing scientific evidence that suggests that
influence can induce behavioral changes among the entities in a network. For example,
∗This work was done while the author was a PhD student at Stony Brook University. Email:
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†Corresponding author. Email: leortiz@cs.stonybrook.edu, Phone: 631-632-1805, Fax: 631-632-8334.
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recent work in medical social sciences posits the intriguing hypothesis that many of our
behavioral aspects, such as smoking (Christakis and Fowler, 2008), obesity (Christakis and
Fowler, 2007), and even happiness (Fowler and Christakis, 2008) are contagious within a
social network.
Regardless of the specific problem addressed, the underlying system under study in that
research exhibits several core features. First, it is often very large and complex, with many
entities exhibiting different behaviors and interactions. Second, the network structure of
complex interactions is central. Third, the directions and strengths of local influences are
highlighted as very relevant to the global behavior of the system as a whole. Fourth, the
view that the behavioral choice of an individual in the network is potentially strategic, given
that one’s choice depends on the choices made by one’s peers.
The prevalence of systems and problems like the ones just described, combined with the
obvious issue of often limited control over individuals, raises immediate, broad, difficult,
and longstanding policy questions: e.g., Can we achieve a desired goal, such as reducing
the level of smoking or controlling obesity via targeted, minimal interventions in a system?
How do we optimally allocate our often limited resources to achieve the largest impact in
such systems?
Clearly, these issues are not exclusive to obesity, smoking or happiness; similar is-
sues arise in a large variety of settings: drug use, vaccination, crime networks, security,
marketing, markets, the economy, and public policy-making and regulations, and even con-
gressional voting! 1 The work reported in this paper is in large part motivated by such
questions/settings and their broader implication.
We begin by providing a brief and informal description of our approach to influence
in networks. In the next section, we place our approach within the context of existing
literature.
1.1 Overview of Our Model of Influence
Consider a social network where each individual has a binary choice of action or behavior,
denoted by −1 and 1. Let us represent this network as a directed graph, where each node
represents an individual. Each node of this graph has a threshold level, which can be
positive, negative, or zero; and the threshold levels of all the nodes are not required to
be the same. Each arc of this graph is weighted by an influence factor, which signifies
the level of direct influence the tail node of that arc has on the head node. Again, the
influence factors can be positive, negative, or zero and are not required to be the same (i.e.,
symmetric) between two nodes.
Given such a network, our model specifies the best response of a node (i.e., what action
it should choose) with respect to the actions chosen by the other nodes. The best response
of a node is to adopt the action 1 if the total influence on it exceeds its threshold and −1
1For the last example, consider (one of) the so-called “debt-ceiling crisis” in the U.S. in 2011, which
received a lot of national and international media attention. One may argue that the last-minute deal
between democratic and republican senators, which helped avoid an “undesirable situation,” bears a clear
signature of influence among the senators in a strategic setting. Moreover, it is hard not to view the
bipartisan “gang-of-six” senators, specifically chosen to work out a solution to that crisis, as a type of
intervention in such large, complex systems; that is, interventions via the formation of groups that would
not naturally arise otherwise.
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if the opposite happens. (In the case of a tie, the node is indifferent between choosing 1
and −1, i.e., either would be its best response.) Here, we calculate the total influence on
a node as follows. First, sum up the incoming influence factors on the node from the ones
who have adopted the action 1. Second, sum up those influence factors that are coming in
from the ones who have adopted −1. Finally, subtract the second sum from the first to get
the total influence on that node.
Clearly, in a network with n nodes, there are 2n possible joint actions, resulting from
the action choice of each individual node. Among all these joint actions, we call the ones
where every node has chosen its best response to everyone else a pure-strategy Nash equilibria
(PSNE). We use PSNE to mathematically model the stable outcomes that such a networked
system could support.
1.2 Overview of the Most-Influential-Nodes Problem
We formulate the most-influential-nodes problem with respect to a goal of interest. The
“goal of interest” indirectly determines what we call the desired stable outcome(s). Un-
like the mainstream literature on the most-influential-nodes problem (Kleinberg, 2007),
maximizing the spread of a particular behavior is not our objective. Rather, the desired
stable outcome(s) resulting from the goal of interest is what determines our computational
objective. In addition, while for some instances of our general formulation of the most-
influential-nodes problem in our context our goal may be some stable outcome with the
largest number of nodes adopting a particular behavior, our solution concept abstracts
away and does not rely on the dynamics or the so-called “diffusion” process by which such
a “spread of behavior” happens.
Roughly speaking, in our approach, we consider a set of individuals S in a network to
be most influential, with respect to a set of desired stable outcomes that satisfy a particular
goal of interest, if S is the most preferred subset among all those that satisfy the following
condition: were the individuals in S to choose the behavior xS prescribed to them by a
desired stable outcome x ≡ (xS ,x−S) which achieves the goal of interest, then the only
stable outcome of the system that remains consistent with their choices xS is x itself.
Said more intuitively, once the nodes in the most influential set S follow the behavior
xS prescribed to them by a desired stable outcome x achieving the goal of interest, they
become collectively “so influential” that their behavior “forces” every other individual to
a unique choice of behavior! Our proposed concept of the most influential individuals is
illustrated in Figure 1 with a very simple example.
Now, there could be many different sets S that satisfy the above condition. For example,
S could consist of all the individuals, which might not be what we want. To account for this,
we also specify a preference over all subsets of individuals. While this preference function
could in principle be arbitrary, a natural example would be one that prefers a set S the
with the minimum cardinality.
1.3 Our Contributions
Our major contributions include
3
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Figure 1: Illustration of our approach to influence in networks. Each node has
a binary choice of behavior, {−1,+1}, and, in this instance, wants to behave like the
majority of its neighbors (and is indifferent if there is a tie). We adopt pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium (formally defined later), abbreviated as PSNE, as the notion of stable outcome.
The network is shown in (a) and the enumeration of PSNE (a row for each PSNE, where
black denotes node’s behavior 1, gray −1) in (b). We want to achieve the objective of every
node choosing 1 (desired outcome). Selecting the set of nodes {1, 2, 3} and assigning these
nodes behavior prescribed by the desired outcome (i.e., 1 for each) lead to two consistent
stable outcomes of the system, shown in (c) and (d). Thus, {1, 2, 3} cannot be a most-
influential set of nodes in our setting. On the other hand, selecting {1, 6} and assigning
these nodes behavior 1 lead to the desired outcome as the unique stable outcome remaining.
Therefore, {1, 6} is a most-influential set, even though these two nodes are at the fringes of
the network. Furthermore, note that {1, 6} is not most influential in the diffusion setting,
since it does not maximize the spread of behavior 1. Also note that {3, 4} is another most-
influential set in our setting. (Of course, we study a much richer class of games in this
paper than this particular instance.)
1. a new approach, grounded in non-cooperative game theory, to the study of influence
in networks where individuals exhibit strategic behavior ;
2. influence games as a new class of graphical games to model the behavior of individuals
in networks, including establishing connections to potential games and polymatrix
games;
3. a theoretical and empirical study of various computational aspects of influence games,
including an algorithm for identifying the most influential individuals; and
4. the application of our approach to two real-world settings: the U.S. Supreme Court
and the U.S. Senate.
2 Background
“Influence” in social networks, however defined, has been a subject of both theoretical and
empirical studies for decades (see, e.g., Wasserman and Faust (1994) and the references
therein). Although our focus is primarily on computation, the roots of our model go back
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to early literature in sociology on collective behavior, and more recent literature on collective
action. In this section, we will place our model in the context of the relevant literature from
sociology, economics, and computer science. 2
2.1 Connection to Collective Action in Sociology
Although our approach may seem close to the rational calculus models of collective action
(see Appendix A for a detailed description), particularly to Granovetter (1978)’s threshold
models, our objective is very much different from that of collective action theory. The
focus of collective action theory in sociology is to explain how individual behavior in a
group leads to collective outcomes. For example, Schelling (1971, 1978)’s models explain
how different distributions of the level of tolerances of individuals lead to residential seg-
regations of different properties. Berk (1974) explains how a compromise (such as placing
a barricade) evolves within a mixture of rational individuals of different predispositions
(militants vs. moderates). Granovetter (1978) shows how a little perturbation in the dis-
tribution of thresholds can possibly lead to a completely different collective outcome. In
short, explaining collective social phenomena is at the heart of all these studies.
While such an explanation is a scientific pursuit of utmost importance, our focus is
rather on an engineering approach to predicting stable behavior in a networked population
setting. Our approach is not to go through the fine-grained details of a process, such as
forward recursion, which is often plagued with problems when the sociomatrix contains
negative elements. Instead, we adopt the notion of PSNE to define stable outcomes. Said
differently, the path to an equilibrium is not what we focus on; rather, it is the prediction
of the equilibrium itself that we focus on.
We next justify our approach in the context of rational calculus models.
2.1.1 PSNE as the solution concept
Nash equilibrium is the most central solution concept in non-cooperative game theory. The
fundamental aspect of a Nash equilibrium is stability. That is, at a Nash equilibrium, no
“player” has any incentive to deviate from it, assuming the others do not deviate either.
As a result, Nash equilibrium is very often a natural choice to mathematically model stable
outcomes of a complex system.
In this work, we adopt PSNE, one particular form of Nash equilibrium, to model the
stable behavioral outcomes of a networked system of influence. 3
2To avoid a long aside, and in the interest of keeping the flow of our presentation, we refer the interested
reader to Appendix B for a more detailed exposition on the connection of our model to the century-old
study of collective behavior and collective action in sociology.
3As a side note, interested readers can find more on the interpretation of Nash equilibrium, including its
underlying concept of stability, in (Luce and Raiffa, 1957, Ch. 7) and (Osborne, 2003, Ch. 2–4). Although
we use the notion of PSNE in its original form, we note here that Nash equilibrium has been refined in
various ways with particular applications in mind (Laffont, 1995, Ch. 2). Furthermore, as mentioned above,
we purposefully avoid the question of how a PSNE is reached and focus on the prediction of PSNE instead.
For the interested reader, there is a large body of literature on how a Nash equilibrium may be reached,
although there is no general consensus on this topic (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998).
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2.1.2 Abstraction of fine-grained details
Sociologists have recorded minute details of various collective action scenarios in order to
substantiate their theories with empirical accounts. However, in the application scenarios
that we are interested in, such as strategic interaction in the U.S. Congress and the U.S.
Supreme Court, very little details can be obtained about how a collective outcome emerges.
For example, the Budget Control Act of 2011 was passed by 74–26 votes in the U.S.
Senate on August 2, 2011, ending a much debated debt-ceiling crisis. Despite intense
media coverage, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to give an accurate account of how
this agreement on debt-ceiling was reached. Even if there were an exact account of every
conversation and every negotiation that had taken place, it would be extremely challenging
to translate such a subjective account into a mathematically defined process, let alone
learning the parameters and computing stable outcomes of such a complex model.
2.1.3 Influence games as a less-restrictive model
Typical models of dynamics used in the existing literature almost always impose restrictions
or assumptions to keep the model simple enough to permit analytical solutions, or to
facilitate algorithmic analysis. For example, as mentioned above, the forward recursion
process implicitly assumes that the sociomatrix does not have negative elements. The hope
is that the essence of the general phenomena that one wants to capture with the model
remains even after imposing such restrictions.
In our case, by using the concept of PSNE to abstract dynamical processes, we can
deal with rich models without having to impose some of the same restrictions, and at
the same time, we can capture equilibria beyond the ones captured by a simple model of
dynamics. In particular, our model captures any equilibrium that the process of forward
recursion converges to (with any initial configuration); but in addition, our model can
capture equilibria that the forward recursion process cannot.
2.1.4 Focus on practical applications
Although our model of influence games is grounded in non-cooperative game theory, the
way we apply it to real-world settings such as the U.S. Congress is deeply rooted in modern
AI (Russell and Norvig, 2009). One of the distinctive features of the field of AI is that it is
able to build useful tools, often without gaining the full scientific knowledge of how a system
works. For example, even though we do not have a full understanding or model of the exact
process by which humans’ perform inferences and reason when performing tasks as simple
as playing different types of parlor games, modern AI has been able to devise systems that
perform better than humans on the same tasks, often by a considerable margin (Russell
and Norvig, 2009).
The scientific question of how humans perform inferences or reason is of course very
important, but, in our view, which may be the prevailing view, the modern focus of AI in
general is to engineer solutions that would serve our purpose without necessarily having
to explain the specific and intricate details of complex physical phenomena often found
in the real world (Russell and Norvig, 2009). Of course, under the right conditions, AI
does sometimes help experts understand physical phenomena too, although not necessarily
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purposefully, by suggesting effective insights and potentially useful directions, as obtained
from modern AI-based models or systems. 4
In short, we propose an AI-based approach, including AI-inspired models and algo-
rithms, to build a computational tool for predicting the behavior of large, networked pop-
ulations. Our approach does not model the complex behavioral dynamics in the network,
but abstracts it via PSNE. This allows us to deal with a rich set of models and concentrate
our efforts on the prediction of stable outcomes.
2.2 Connection to Literature on Most-Influential Nodes
To date, the study of influence in a network, by both economists (Morris, 2000; Chwe, 1999)
and computer scientists (Kleinberg, 2007; Even-Dar and Shapira, 2007), has been rooted
in rational calculus models of behavior. Their approach to connecting individual behavior
to collective outcome is mostly by adopting the process of forward recursion (Granovetter,
1978, p. 1426), which is often employed in studying diffusion of innovations (Granovetter
and Soong, 1983, p. 168). As a result, the term “contagion” in these settings has a
rational connotation contrary to the early sociology literature on collective behavior, where
“contagion” or “social contagion” alludes to irrational and often hysteric nature of the
individuals in a crowd (Park and Burgess, 1921; Blumer, 1939). The computational question
of identifying the most influential nodes in a network (Kleinberg, 2007), originally posed by
Domingos and Richardson (Domingos and Richardson, 2001), has also been studied using
forward recursion within the context of rational-calculus models.
In the traditional setting as described by Kleinberg (2007), “cascade” or “diffusion
models,” each node behaves in one of these two ways—it either adopts a new behavior or
does not, and initially, none of the nodes adopts the new behavior. Given a number k,
their formulation of the most-influential-nodes problem in the cascade model within the
diffusion setting asks us to select a set of k nodes such that the spread of the new behavior
is maximized by the selected nodes being the initial adopters of the new behavior. (Note
that in their setting, the set of initial adopters, some of whom may have thresholds greater
than 0, are externally selected in order to set off the forward recursion process, whereas
in Granovetter’s setting, the initial adopters must have a threshold of 0.) The most-
influential-nodes question in the cascade or diffusion settings typically concerns infinite
graphs (Kleinberg, 2007, p. 615), such as Morris’ local interaction games (Morris, 2000, p.
59). In contrast, we concern ourselves with large but finite graphs here.
The notion of “most influential nodes” used in this paper is just different than the
one traditionally used within the diffusion setting because it seeks to address problems
in different settings (i.e., fully/strictly strategic) and achieve generally different objectives
(i.e., desired stable outcomes relative to whatever the goal of interest happens to be). If
anything, our approach, by taking a strictly game-theoretic perspective, may complement
the traditional line of work based on diffusion, although even that is not really our main
intent. In our view, these are clearly disparate, non-competing approaches. Yet, despite
these fundamental differences in objectives, settings, models, problem formulations, solution
4One relatively recent example is the research by psychologist Alison Gopnik, which suggests that young
children, even 2-year-olds, perform Bayesian (belief) inference while learning from the environment (Gopnik
et al., 2004).
7
concepts and simply general approach, in the following paragraphs, because of the high
level of interest in diffusion models within the most recent (theoretical) computer science
literature, we still attempt to briefly mention some possible points of contrast between
the typical approach to identifying the most influential nodes in the diffusion setting, as
described by Kleinberg (2007), and ours. 5
2.2.1 Stability of outcomes
A subtle aspect of diffusion models is that each node in the network behaves as an indepen-
dent agent. Any observed influence that a node’s neighbors impose on the node is the result
of the same node’s “rational” or “natural” response to the neighbors’ behavior. Thus, in
many cases, it would be desirable that the solution to the most-influential-nodes problem
lead us to a stable outcome of the system, in which each node’s behavior is a best response
to the neighbors’ behavior. However, if we select a set of nodes with the goal of maximizing
the spread of the new behavior, then some of the selected nodes may end up “unhappy” be-
ing the initial adopters of the new behavior, with respect to their neighbors’ final behavior
at the end of forward recursion. For example, a selected node’s best behavioral response
could be not adopting the new behavior after all.
We believe that in some cases it is more natural to require that the desired final state
of the system, such as, e.g., the state in which the maximum possible number of individuals
adopting a particular behavior, be stable (i.e., everyone is “happy” with their behavioral
response).
2.2.2 On arbitrary influence factors: positive and negative
In general, to address the question of finding the most influential nodes, the forward recur-
sion process has been modeled as “monotonic.” (Here, a monotonic process refers to the
setting where once an agent adopts the new behavior, it cannot go back.) Even in more
recent work on influence maximization and minimization (Budak et al., 2011; Chen et al.,
2011; He et al., 2012), the influence factors (or weights on the edges) are defined to be
non-negative. 6 If we think of an application such as reducing the incidence of smoking or
obesity, then a model that allows a “change of mind” based on the response of the immedi-
ate neighborhood may make more sense. Thus, a notable contrast between the traditional
treatment of the most-influential-nodes problem and ours is that we do not restrict the
influence among the nodes of the network to non-negative numbers.
In fact, in many applications, both positive and negative influence factors may exist in
the same problem instance. Take the U.S. Congress as an example: senators belonging to
the same party may have non-negative influence factors on each other (as usually perceived
from voting instances on legislation issues), but one senator may (and often does) have a
negative influence on another belonging to a different party. While generalized versions of
5The reader should bear in mind that our intent is not to argue for or against one approach over the
other, as each has their own pros and cons.
6From the description of He et al. (2012)’s model, it may at first seem that they are allowing both
positive and negative influence weights. However, that is not the case. Their terminology of “positive”
and “negative” weights on the edges refers to the positive and negative cascades that are defined in their
context. The values of the weights are non-negative.
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threshold models that allow “reversals” have been derived in the social science literature,
to the best of our knowledge, there is no substantive work on the most-influential-nodes
problem in that context. 7
2.2.3 Abstraction of intricate dynamics
Finally, the traditional approach to the most-influential-nodes problem emphasizes model-
ing the complex dynamics of interactions among nodes as a way to a final answer: a set of
the most influential nodes. In fact, our model is inspired by the same threshold models used
for the traditional approach. However, as mentioned earlier, our emphasis is not on the
dynamics of interactions, but on the stable outcomes in a game-theoretic setting. By doing
this, we seek to capture significant, basic, and core strategic aspects of complex interaction
in networks that naturally appear in many real-world problems (e.g., identifying the most
influential senators in the U.S. Congress). Of course, we recognize the importance of the
dynamics of interactions when modeling and studying problems of influence at a fine level
of detail. Yet, we believe that our approach can still capture significant aspects of the
problem even at the coarser level of “steady-state” or stable outcomes.
2.2.4 A brief note on submodularity
Submodularity plays a central role in the (algorithmic) analysis of traditional diffusion
models in computer science. A deeper implication of allowing negative influence factors
in the traditional diffusion models is that we cannot restrict them to submodular influence
“spread” functions. 8 This lack of submodularity of the “influence spread function” voids the
highly heralded theoretical guarantees of simple, greedy-selection approximation algorithms
commonly used for the problem of selecting most influential nodes in the cascade model.
In general, the role that submodularity plays in our approach, if any, is not evident.
In fact, it is unclear what the equivalent or analogous concept of the “influence spread
function” is in our setting, given that we do not explicitly consider the dynamics by which
stable outcomes may arise. We realize that this may be a point of contention, but we
delay a more substantive formal discussion on this matter until after we formally define the
problem of identifying most-influential nodes in our setting in Section 3.2.
2.3 Related Work in Game Theory
Other researchers have used similar game-theoretic notions of “influential individuals” in
specific contexts. Particularly close to ours is the work of Heal and Kunreuther (2003, 2005,
2006, 2007), Kunreuther and Heal (2003), Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2009), Ballester
et al. (2004, 2006), and Kearns and Ortiz (2004).
Also, our interest is on identifying an “optimal” set of influential nodes for a variety of
optimality criteria, depending on the particular context of interest. For instance, we may
7Note that this is different from recent work in diffusion settings on the notion of positive and negative
opinions (Chen et al., 2011; Budak et al., 2011), which in our case would correspond to differing choices
of behavior, and the notion of simultaneously occurring positive and negative “cascades” (He et al., 2012),
used to model, e.g., the spread of two competing ideas.
8Given a set of initial adopters, the influence spread function gives the number of nodes that would
ultimately adopt the new behavior in a diffusion setting.
9
prefer the set of influential individuals of minimal size. Such a preference is similar to the
concept of “minimal critical coalitions” in the work of Heal and Kunreuther (2003, 2005,
2006, 2007) and Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2009).
Mechanism design is a core area in game theory whose main focus is to “engineer”
games, by changing the existing underlaying game or by creating a new one, whose stable
outcomes (i.e., equilibria) achieve a desired objective (Nisan, 2007). Although our notion
of the most influential individuals is also defined with respect to a desired objective, our
approach is conceptually very different. We are not interested in changing, defining, or
engineering a new system—the system is what it is. Rather, our interest is in altering the
behavior within the same system so as to “lead” or “tip” the system to achieve a desired
stable outcome.
In the next section, we will formally define our model of influence game and our notion
of “most influential nodes” in a network. We will also establish connections to well-studied
classes of game models in game theory: polymatrix and potential games.
3 Influence Games
Inspired by threshold models (Granovetter, 1978), we introduce network influence games—
in brief, influence games—as a model of influence in large networked populations. 9 Even
though the model falls within the general class of graphical games (Kearns et al., 2001), a
distinctive feature of the instance of influence games we concentrate on most in this paper,
the linear influence game, formally defined in Section 3.3, is a very compact, parametric
representation. Our emphasis is on the problem of computing stable outcomes of systems
of influence and identifying influential agents within the network relative to a particular
objective.
3.1 Our Game-Theoretic Model of Behavior
We will first formalize influence games as a model of behavior. Let n be the number of
individuals in a population. For simplicity, we restrict our attention to the case of binary
behavior, a common assumption in most of the work in this area. Thus, xi ∈ {−1, 1} denotes
the behavior of individual i, where xi = 1 indicates that i “adopts” a particular behavior
and xi = −1 indicates i “does not adopt” the behavior. Some examples of behavior of this
kind are supporting a particular political measure, candidate or party; holding a particular
view or belief; vaccinating against a particular disease; installing virus protection software
(and keeping it up-to-date); acquiring fire/home insurance; becoming overweight; taking
up smoking; becoming a criminal or participating in criminal activity; among many others.
First, we denote by fi : {−1, 1}n−1 → R the function that quantifies the influence of
other individuals on i.
9As pointed out by a reviewer, the term influence games has been used in various contexts. For example,
there exist cooperative influence games (Molinero et al., 2013), political influence games (Congleton, 2000;
Becker, 1983), judicial influence games (Bardsley and Nguyen, 2005), and dynamic influence games (Levy
and Razin, 2011), to name a few. Our network influence games appear to be different from the above games
and does not seek to generalize any of them.
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Definition 3.1 (Payoff Function). In influence games, we define the payoff function ui :
{−1, 1}n → R quantifying the preferences of each player i as ui(xi,x−i) ≡ xifi(x−i), where
x−i denotes the vector of all joint-actions excluding that of i.
Using the above definition and notations, we define an influence game as follows.
Definition 3.2 (Influence Game). An influence game G is defined by a set of n players
and for each player i, a set of actions {−1, 1} and a payoff function ui : {−1, 1}n → R.
Next, we characterize the stable outcomes of an influence games. We start with the
definition of the best-response correspondence.
Definition 3.3 (Best-Response Correspondence). Given x−i ∈ {−1, 1}n−1, the best-response
correspondence BRGi : {−1, 1}n−1 → 2{−1,1} of a player i of an influence game G is defined
as follows.
BRGi (x−i) ≡ arg maxxi∈{−1,1}ui(xi,x−i).
Therefore, for all individuals i and any possible behavior x−i ∈ {−1, 1}n−1 of the other
individuals in the population, the best-response behavior x∗i of individual i to the behavior
x∗−i of others satisfies
fi(x
∗
−i) > 0 =⇒ x∗i = 1,
fi(x
∗
−i) < 0 =⇒ x∗i = −1, and
fi(x
∗
−i) = 0 =⇒ x∗i ∈ {−1, 1}.
Informally, “positive influences” lead an individual to adopt the behavior, while “negative
influences” lead the individual to “reject” the behavior; the individual is indifferent if
there is “no influence.” We formally characterize the stable outcomes of the system by
the following notion of pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) of the corresponding influence
game.
Definition 3.4 (Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium). A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE)
of an influence game G is a behavior assignment x∗ ∈ {−1, 1}n that satisfies the following
condition. Each player i’s behavior x∗i is a (simultaneous) best-response to the behavior x
∗
−i
of the rest.
We denote the set of all PSNE of the game G by
NE(G) ≡ {x∗ ∈ {−1, 1}n | x∗i ∈ BRGi (x∗−i) for all i}.
3.2 Most Influential Nodes: Problem Formulation
In formulating the most-influential-nodes problem in a network, we depart from the tra-
ditional model of diffusion and adopt influence games as the model of strategic behavior
among the nodes in the network. We introduce two functions in our definition which we
discuss in more detail immediately after the problem formulation. One is what we call
the “goal” or “objective function,” denoted by g, which we introduce as a way to formally
express that, in our approach, the notion of “most influential” is relative to a specific goal
or objective of interest. The other, which we call the “set-preference function” and denote
by h, is a way to choose among all sets of nodes that achieve our goal of interest.
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Definition 3.5. Let G be an influence game, g : {−1, 1}n × 2[n] → R be the goal or
objective function mapping a joint-action and a subset of the players in G to a real number
quantifying the general preferences over the space of joint-actions and players’ subsets,
and h : 2[n] → R be the set-preference function mapping a subset of the players to a real
number quantifying the a priori preference over the space of players’ subsets. Denote by
X ∗g (S) ≡ arg maxx∈NE(G)g(x, S) the optimal set of PSNE of G, with respect to g and a
fixed subset of players S ⊂ [n]. We say that a set of nodes/players S∗ ⊂ [n] in G is most
influential with respect to g and h, if
S∗ ∈ arg maxS⊂[n]h(S), s.t., |{x ∈ NE(G) | xS = x∗S ,x∗ ∈ X ∗g (S)}| = 1.
As mentioned earlier, we can interpret the players in S∗ to be collectively so influential
that they are able to restrict every other player’s choice of action to a unique one: the
action prescribed by some desired stable outcome x∗.
An example of a goal function g that captures the objective of achieving a specific
stable outcome x∗ ∈ NE(G) is g(x, S) ≡ 1[x = x∗]. Another example that captures the
objective of achieving a stable outcome with the largest number of individuals adopting
the behavior is g(x, S) ≡∑ni=1 xi+12 , or equivalently, g(x, S) ≡∑ni=1 xi. Note that both of
the functions just presented ignore the set S. One alternative that does not is g(x, S) ≡∑
i∈S tixi −
∑
i/∈S tixi, where the ti’s reflect a weighted preference over individual nodes,
e.g., thus capturing interest in some “weighted maximum set of adopters.”
A common example of the set-preference function h that captures the preference for
sets of small cardinality is to simply define h such that h(S) > h(S′) iff |S| < |S′|. Similar
to the last objective function described in the previous paragraph, an alternative is h(S) ≡∑
i∈S vi−
∑
i/∈S vi, where the vi’s reflect a weighted preference over individual nodes in any
set S that achieves the objective of interest.
3.2.1 On the topic of submodularity
As briefly discussed in Section 2.2.4, the computer-science community is enthusiastic about
the submodularity of the so called “influence spread function.” One reason for the intense
interest is the important role submodularity plays in the algorithmic design and analysis of
methods to solve the “most influential nodes” problem as formulated within the diffusion
setting using the cascade model (Kleinberg, 2007). Because our approach abstracts away
the dynamics, it is not even clear what such “influence spread function” is in our context,
or even whether it could be meaningfully defined.
In this paragraph, we will consider a potential definition and discuss its meaning or im-
plications, if any. We first introduce some additional notation to simplify the presentation.
We denote the set involved in the uniqueness condition in the last equation presented in the
definition of the problem formulation by Cg,G(S) ≡ {x ∈ NE(G) | xS = x∗S ,x∗ ∈ X ∗g (S)}.
Perhaps the most direct attempt at defining a notion analogous to the “influence spread
function” in the diffusion setting, which in our context we will denote by fg,h,G , may be
to let fg,h,G(S) ≡ h(S) − λ|Cg,G(S)|, for some constant λ > 0. We can interpret such an
fg,h,G as trying to minimize the PSNE consistent with assigning the nodes in S according
to some goal PSNE, while maximizing a general preference over subsets as captured by h,
modulo a “penalization constant” λ. Yet, we cannot say anything meaningful about such
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an “influence spread function” in general, even for the most common instantiations of g and
h; except perhaps that it is at best unclear to us that the question of whether that function
is submodular makes sense, or whether it could even have a reasonable answer. To start,
one major reason for our inability to say anything meaningful at this moment is that we
are unaware of any PSNE characterization result that would apply to our setting. It seems
to us that such characterizations would be key in any study of the potential submodularity
properties of that “influence spread function” fg,h,G as we just defined it.
The study of other potential definitions of an “influence spread function” in our setting,
as well as their properties, is beyond the scope of this paper. (In fact, we do not know of
any other reasonable alternatives, beyond simple variations of the function defined above.)
More importantly, we leave open for future work the study of the potential relevance that
submodularity may have within our approach, beyond the indirect connection through the
characteristics of certain classes of influence games discussed in the next section, Section 4
(i.e., strategic complementarity and substitutability).
3.3 Linear Influence Games (LIG)
A simple instantiation of the general influence game model just described is the case of
linear influences.
Definition 3.6. In a linear influence game (LIG), the influence function of each individual
i is defined as fi(x−i) ≡
∑
j 6=iwjixj − bi where for any other individual j, wji ∈ R is
a weight parameter quantifying the “influence factor” that j has on i, and bi ∈ R is a
threshold parameter for i’s level of “tolerance” for negative effects.
It follows from Definition 3.1 that although the influence function of an LIG is linear,
its payoff function is quadratic. Furthermore, the following argument shows that an LIG
is a special type of graphical game in parametric form. In general, the influence factors
wji induce a directed graph, where nodes represent individuals, and therefore, we obtain a
graphical game having a linear (in the number of edges) representation size, as opposed to
the exponential (in the maximum degree of a node) representation size of general graphical
games in normal form (Kearns et al., 2001). In particular, there is a directed edge (or arc)
from individual j to i iff wji 6= 0.
Example. Figure 1 shows an example of an LIG with binary behavior. Here, for each
edge (i, j), wji = 1 and wij = 1. That is, the game is a special type of LIG with symmetric
influence factors. Furthermore, for each node i, its threshold bi is defined to be 0. Therefore,
at any PSNE of this game, each node wants to adopt the behavior of the majority of its
neighbors and it is indifferent in the case of a tie.
3.3.1 Connection to Polymatrix Games
Polymatrix games (Janovskaja, 1968) are n-player noncooperative games where a player’s
total payoff is the sum of the partial payoffs received from the other players. Formally,
for any joint action x, player i’s payoff is given by Mi(xi,x−i) ≡
∑
j 6=i αji(xj , xi), where
αji(xj , xi) is the partial payoff that i receives from j when i plays xi and j plays xj . Note
that this partial payoff is local in nature and is not affected by the choice of actions of the
other nodes. We will consider polymatrix games with only binary actions {1,−1} here.
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The following property shows an equivalence between LIGs and 2-action polymatrix
games. Thus, our computational study of LIGs directly carries over to 2-action polymatrix
games.
Proposition 3.7. LIGs are equivalent to 2-action polymatrix games, modulo the set of
PSNE. 10
Proof. Assume that the number of players n > 1; otherwise, the statement holds trivially.
We first show that given any instance of an LIG, we can design a polymatrix game that
has the same set of PSNE. In an LIG instance, player i’s payoff is given by
ui(xi,x−i) = xi
∑
j 6=i
wjixj − bi

= xi
∑
j 6=i
(
wjixj − bi
n− 1
)
=
∑
j 6=i
(
xiwjixj − xibi
n− 1
)
.
Thus, constructing a polymatrix game instance by defining αji(xj , xi) ≡ xiwjixj − xibin−1 ,
we have the same set of PSNE in both instances.
Next, we show the reverse direction. Player i’s payoff in a 2-action polymatrix game is
given by
Mi(xi,x−i) =
∑
j 6=i
αji(xj , xi)
=
∑
j 6=i
(1[xi = 1]αji(xj , 1) + 1[xi = −1]αji(xj ,−1))
=
∑
j 6=i
(
1 + xi
2
αji(xj , 1) +
1− xi
2
αji(xj ,−1)
)
=
xi
2
∑
j 6=i
(αji(xj , 1)− αji(xj ,−1)) + 1
2
∑
j 6=i
(αji(xj , 1)+
αji(xj ,−1)) .
10We present this result in the context of PSNE because that is the solution concept we use throughout
the paper. However, this result easily extends to the more general notion of correlated equilibria (CE)
(Aumann, 1974, 1987), which in turn generalizes the notion of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria (MSNE)
(Nash, 1951). (See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for textbook definitions of CE and MSNE.) The reason the
result generalizes is that, as is well-known, two games with the same number of players and the same set
of actions for each player have the same CE set if the set of payoff functions {u1i } and {u2i } of the games 1
and 2, respectively, satisfy the following condition: for all players i, there exist a positive constant ci > 0
and an arbitrary real-valued function di of the actions of all the players except i, such that, u
1
i (x1,x−i) =
ci u
2
i (xi,x−i) +di(x−i). It is known that the computation of MSNE of 2-action polymatrix games is PPAD-
hard. (It follows from the result of Daskalakis et al. (2009), although it is not explicitly mentioned there.)
An implication of this is that the computation of MSNE of LIGs is also PPAD-hard.
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Note that the second term above does not have any effect on i’s choice of action. Thus,
we can re-define the payoff of player i, without making any change to the set of PSNE of
the original polymatrix game, as follows.
M ′i(xi,x−i) =
xi
2
∑
j 6=i
(αji(xj , 1)− αji(xj ,−1))
=
xi
2
∑
j 6=i
(1[xj = 1]αji(1, 1) + 1[xj = −1]αji(−1, 1))−
∑
j 6=i
(1[xj = 1]αji(1,−1) + 1[xj = −1]αji(−1,−1))

=
xi
2
∑
j 6=i
(
1 + xj
2
αji(1, 1) +
1− xj
2
αji(−1, 1)
)
−
∑
j 6=i
(
1 + xj
2
αji(1,−1) + 1− xj
2
αji(−1,−1)
)
=
xi
4
∑
j 6=i
xj (αji(1, 1)− αji(−1, 1)− αji(1,−1) + αji(−1,−1))
+
∑
j 6=i
(αji(1, 1) + αji(−1, 1)− αji(1,−1)− αji(−1,−1))
 .
Therefore, we can construct an LIG that has exactly the same set of PSNE as the
polymatrix game, in the following way. For any player i, define bi ≡ −
∑
j 6=i
1
4(αji(1, 1) +
αji(−1, 1) − αji(1,−1) − αji(−1,−1)), and for any player i and any other player j, define
wji ≡ 14(αji(1, 1)− αji(−1, 1)− αji(1,−1) + αji(−1,−1)).
4 Equilibria Computation in Linear Influence Games
We first study the problem of computing and counting PSNE in LIGs. We show that
several special cases of LIGs present us with attractive computational advantages, while
the general problem is intractable unless P = NP. We present heuristics to compute PSNE
in general LIGs.
4.1 Nonnegative Influence Factors
When all the influence factors are non-negative, an LIG is supermodular (Milgrom and
Roberts, 1990; Topkis, 1979). In particular, the game exhibits what is called strategic
complementarity (Bulow et al., 1985; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Topkis, 1979, 1978). 11
11 A formal, general definition of strategic complementarity is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead,
we present a definition in the context of this paper and refer the reader to standard references for a general
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Hence, the best-response dynamics converges in at most n rounds. From this, we obtain
the following result.
Proposition 4.1. The problem of computing a PSNE is in P for LIGs on general graphs
with only non-negative influence factors.
This property implies certain monotonicity of the best-response correspondences. More
specifically, for each player i, if any subset of the other players “increases his/her strategy”
by adopting the new behavior, then player i’s best-response cannot be to abandon adoption
(i.e., move from 1 to −1). In other words, once a player adopts the new behavior, it has
no incentive to go back. This monotonicity property also follows directly from the linear
threshold model. Strategic complementarity implies other interesting characterizations of
the structure of PSNE in LIGs and the behavior of best-response dynamics. For example, it
is not hard to see that such games always have a PSNE: If we start with the complete assign-
ment in which either everyone is playing 1, or everyone is playing −1, parallel/synchronous
best-response dynamics converges after at most n rounds (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). If
both best-response processes starting with all −1’s and all 1’s converge to the same PSNE,
then the PSNE is unique. Otherwise, any other PSNE of the game must be “contained”
between the two different PSNE. We can also view this from the perspective of constraint
propagation with monotonic constraints (Russell and Norvig, 2003).
4.2 Special Influence Structures and Potential Games
Several special subclasses of LIGs are potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996). 12
This connection guarantees the existence of PSNE in such games.
definition. We say that player i in an influence game G exhibits strategic complementarity if for every pair
of the joint-actions x−i and x′−i, if x−i ≥ x′−i, element-wise, implies ui(xi = 1,x−i) ≥ ui(xi = −1,x′−i).
We then say the influence game G, as a whole, exhibits strategic complementarity if every player in the game
does. Intuitively, it says that the action/behavior in the best-response correspondence of any player cannot
“decrease” (i.e., move “down” from {+1} to {−1}, or to {−1,+1} for that matter) if the actions/behavior
of the other players “increases” (i.e., at least one other player moves “up” from −1 to +1); and vice versa.
Thus, roughly speaking, we can say that the players’ actions “complement” each other “strategically;” or
said differently, in general, each player prefers to “play along” by choosing an action “consistent” with that
chosen by the other players: if the other players “move up” or “move down” then the player would like to
“follow along” with the other players by choosing the respective action, or “stay put.”
12A formal, general definition of potential games is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we present
a definition in the context of this paper and refer the reader to the standard reference for a more general
definition (Monderer and Shapley, 1996). We say an influence game G is a ordinal potential game if there
exists a function Φ : {−1,+1}n → R, called the ordinal potential function, independent of any specific player,
such that for every joint-action x, for every player i, and for every possible action/pure-strategy x′i that
player i can take, we have that ui(x
′
i,x−i)− ui(xi,x−i) > 0 if and only if Φ(x′i,x−i)−Φ(xi,x−i) > 0. Note
the abuse of notation by letting Φ(x) ≡ Φ(xi,x−i) for each player i; this is consistent with the same abuse
of notation we use for the payoff functions ui throughout the paper, standard in the game-theory literature.
When the overall condition above is the stricter condition ui(x
′
i,x−i)−ui(xi,x−i) = Φ(x′i,x−i)−Φ(xi,x−i),
then we call G and Φ an exact potential game and function, respectively. For simplicity, we refer to such G
and Φ simply as a potential game and function, when clear from context. Intuitively, the potential function,
a global quantity independent of any specific player, defines the best-response correspondence of each player
in the potential game. Also, the PSNE of a potential game are essentially the local minima (or stationary
points) of the potential function. Hence, one could view the players as trying to optimize the potential
function as a “global group” but via “individual, local best-responses.” By performing asynchronous/non-
simultaneous best-response dynamics, the players are implicitly performing an axis-parallel optimization of
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Proposition 4.2. If the influence factors of an LIG G are symmetric (i.e., wji = wij, for
all i, j), then G is a potential game.
Proof. We show that the game has an ordinal potential function,
Φ(x) =
n∑
t=1
xt
∑
i 6=t
xiwit
2
− bt
 . (1)
Consider any player j. The difference in j’s payoff for xj = 1 and xj = −1 (assuming all
other players play x−j in both cases) is
uj(1,x−j)− uj(−1,x−j)
= 1×
∑
i 6=j
xiwij − bj
− (−1)×
∑
i 6=j
xiwij − bj

= 2×
∑
i 6=j
xiwij − bj
 .
(2)
Next, the difference in the potential function when j plays 1 and −1 is
Φ(1,x−j)− Φ(−1,x−j)
= 1×
∑
i 6=j
xiwij
2
− bj
+∑
t6=j
xt
∑
i 6=t
1[i 6= j]xiwit
2
− bt

+
∑
t6=j
xt
∑
i 6=t
1[i = j]
1× wit
2
− bt
−
(−1)×
∑
i 6=j
xiwij
2
− bj
−∑
t6=j
xt
∑
i 6=t
1[i 6= j]xiwit
2
− bt

−
∑
t6=j
xt
∑
i 6=t
1[i = j]
(−1)× wit
2
− bt

= 2×
∑
i 6=j
xiwij
2
− bj
+ 2×
∑
t6=j
xtwjt
2

= 2×
∑
i 6=j
xiwij − bj
 .
(3)
The last line follows by the symmetry of the weights (i.e., wij = wji).
the potential function. Because the domain of the potential function (i.e., the space of joint-actions) is finite,
this process will always converge to a local maxima or stable point of the potential function, or equivalently,
to a PSNE of the potential game. Hence, every potential games always has a PSNE.
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If, in addition, the threshold bi = 0 for all i, the game is a party-affiliation game, and
computing a PSNE in such games is PLS-complete (Fabrikant et al., 2004).
The following result is on a large class of games that we call indiscriminate LIGs, where
for every player i, the influence weight, wij ≡ δi 6= 0, that i imposes on every other player
j is the same. The interesting aspect of this result is that these LIGs are potential games
despite being possibly asymmetric and exhibiting strategic substitutability (due to negative
influence factors). 13
Proposition 4.3. Let G be an indiscriminate LIG in which all δi for all i, have the same
sign, denoted by ρ ∈ {−1,+1}. Then G is a potential game with the following potential
function Φ(x) = ρ
[
(
∑n
i=1 δixi)
2 − 2∑ni=1 biδixi].
Proof. It is sufficient to show that the sign of the difference in the individual utilities of
any player due to changing her action unilaterally, is the same as the sign of the difference
in the corresponding potential functions. For any player j, the first difference is
1×
∑
i 6=j
δixi − bj
− (−1)×
∑
i 6=j
δixi − bj

= 2
∑
i 6=j
δixi − bj
 .
(4)
The potential function when j plays 1,
Φ(xj = 1,x−j)
= ρ
∑
i 6=j
δixi + δj × 1
2 − 2∑
i 6=j
biδixi − 2bjδj × 1

= ρ
∑
i 6=j
δixi
2 + δj2 + 2
∑
i 6=j
δixi
 δj − 2∑
i 6=j
biδixi − 2bjδj
 .
13Strategic substitutability is essentially the opposite of strategic complementarity, as presented in Foot-
note 11, except that one replaces the ≥ sign with a ≤ sign in the hypothesis condition in the definition
(i.e., x−i ≤ x′−i). Once again a formal, general definition is beyond the scope of this paper. Intuitively,
it says that the action/behavior in the best-response correspondence of any player cannot “decrease” (i.e.,
move “down” from {+1} to {−1}, or to {−1,+1} for that matter) if the actions/behavior of the other
players also “decreases” (i.e., at least one other player moves “down” from +1 to −1); and vice versa. Thus,
roughly speaking, we can say that the players’ actions are “substitutes” of each other “strategically;” or said
differently, in general, each player prefers to play an action that is opposite to/different than that chosen by
the other players: if the other players “move up” or “move down” then the player would like to “go against
the crowd” by choosing an opposite action, or “stay put.”
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The potential function when j plays −1,
Φ(xj = −1,x−j)
= ρ
∑
i 6=j
δixi + δj × (−1)
2 − 2∑
i 6=j
biδixi − 2bjδj × (−1)

= ρ
∑
i 6=j
δixi
2 + δj2 − 2
∑
i 6=j
δixi
 δj − 2∑
i 6=j
biδixi + 2bjδj
 .
Thus, the difference in the potential functions,
Φ(xj = 1,x−j)− Φ(xj = −1,x−j) = 4ρδj
∑
i 6=j
δixi − bj
 . (5)
Since ρδj > 0, the quantities given in (4) and (5) have the same sign.
4.3 Tree-Structured Influence Graphs
The following result follows from a careful, non-trivial modification of the TreeNash al-
gorithm (Kearns et al., 2001). Note that the running time of the TreeNash algorithm is
exponential in the degree of a node and thus also exponential in the representation size of
an LIG! In contrast, our algorithm is linear in the maximum degree and thereby linear in
the representation size of an LIG. The complete proof follows a proof sketch.
Theorem 4.4. There exists an O(nd) time algorithm to find a PSNE, or to decide that
there exists none, in LIGs with tree structures, where d is the maximum degree of a node.
Proof Sketch. We use similar notations as in (Kearns et al., 2001). The modification of
the TreeNash involves efficiently (in O(d) time, not O(2d)) determining the existence of a
witness vector and constructing one, if it exists, at each node during the downstream pass,
in the following way.
Suppose that an internal node i receives tables Tki(xk, xi) from its parents k, and that i
wants to send a table Tij(xi, xj) to its unique child j. If for some parent k of i, Tki(−1, xi) =
0 and Tki(1, xi) = 0, then i sends the following table entries to j: Tij(xi,−1) = 0 and
Tij(xi, 1) = 0. Otherwise, we first partition i’s set of parents into two sets in O(d) time:
Pa1(i, xi) consisting of the parents k of i that have a unique best response xˆk to i’s playing
xi and Pa2(i, xi) consisting of the remaining parents of i. We show that Tij(xi, xj) = 1 iff
xi(xjwji +
∑
k∈Pa1(i,xi)
xˆkwki+∑
t∈Pa2(i,xi)
(2× 1[xiwti > 0]− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
t’s action in witness vector
wti) ≥ 0,
from which we get a witness vector, if it exists.
Following is the complete proof of Theorem 4.4.
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Proof. We denote any node i’s action by xi ∈ {−1, 1}, its threshold by bi, and the influence
of any node i on another node j by wij . Furthermore, denote the set of parents of a node
i by Pa(i). We now describe the two phases of the modified TreeNash algorithm.
1. Downstream phase. In this phase each node sends a table to its unique child. We
denote the table that node i sends to its child j as Tij(xi, xj), indexed by the actions
of i and j, and define the set of conditional best-responses of a node i to a neighboring
node j’s action xj as BRi(j, xj) ≡ {xi | Tij(xi, xj) = 1}. If |BRi(j, xj)| = 1 then we
will abuse this notation by letting BRi(j, xj) be the unique best-response of i to j’s
action xj .
The downstream phase starts at the leaf nodes. Each leaf node l sends a table
Tlk(xl, xk) to its child k, where Tlk(xl, xk) = 1 if and only if xl is a conditional best-
response of l to k’s choice of action xk. Suppose that an internal node i obtains tables
Tki(xk, xi) from its parents k ∈ Pa(i), and that i needs to send a table to its child
j. Once i receives the tables from its parents, it first computes (in O(d) time) the
following three sets that partition the parents of i based on the size of their conditional
best-response sets when i plays xi.
Par(i, xi) ≡ {k s.t. k ∈ Pa(i) and |BRk(i, xi)| = r}, for r = 0, 1, 2.
This is how i computes the table Tij(xi, xj) sent to j: Tij(xi, xj) = 1 if and only if
there exists a witness vector (xk)k∈Pa(i) that satisfies the following two conditions:
Condition 1. Tki(xk, xi) = 1 for all k ∈ Pa(i).
Condition 2. The action xi is a best-response of node i when every node k ∈ Pa(i)
plays xk and j plays xj .
There are two cases.
Case I: Pa0(i, xi) 6= ∅. In this case, there exists some parent k of i for which both
Tki(−1, xi) = 0 and Tki(1, xi) = 0. Therefore, there exists no witness vector that
satisfies Condition 1, and i sends the following table entries to j: Tij(xi, xj) = 0, for
xj = −1, 1.
Case II: Pa0(i, xi) = ∅. In this case, we will show that there exists a witness vector
for Tij(xi, xj) = 1 satisfying Conditions 1 and 2 if and only if the following inequality
holds (which can be verified in O(d) time). Below, we will use the sign function σ:
σ(x) = 1 if x > 0, and σ(x) = −1 otherwise.
xi
wjixj + ∑
k∈Pa1(i,xi)
wkiBRk(i, xi) +
∑
k∈Pa2(i,xi)
wkiσ(xiwki)− bi
 ≥ 0. (6)
In fact, if Inequality (6) holds then we can construct a witness vector in the following
way: If k ∈ Pa1(i, xi), then let xk = BRk(i, xi), otherwise, let xk = σ(xiwki). Since
each parent k of i is playing its conditional best-response xk to i’s choice of action xi,
we obtain, Tki(xk, xi) = 1 for all k ∈ Pa(i). Furthermore, Inequality (6) says that i is
20
playing its best-response xi to each of its parent k playing xk and its child j playing
xj .
To prove the reverse direction, we start with a witness vector (xk)k∈Pa(i) such that
Conditions 1 and 2 specified above hold. In particular, we can write Condition 2 as
xi
wjixj + ∑
k∈Pa(i)
wkixk − bi
 ≥ 0. (7)
The following line of arguments shows that Inequality (6) holds.
xiwkiσ(xiwki) ≥ xiwkixk, for any k ∈ Pa2(i, xi)
⇒ xi
∑
k∈Pa2(i,xi)
wkiσ(xiwki) ≥ xi
∑
k∈Pa2(i,xi)
wkixk
⇒ xi
wjixj + ∑
k∈Pa1(i,xi)
wkiBRk(i, xi) +
∑
k∈Pa2(i,xi)
wkiσ(xiwki)− bi

≥ xi
wjixj + ∑
k∈Pa(i)
wkixk − bi

⇒ xi
wjixj + ∑
k∈Pa1(i,xi)
wkiBRk(i, xi) +
∑
k∈Pa2(i,xi)
wkiσ(xiwki)− bi

≥ 0, using Inequality (7).
In addition to computing the table Tij , node i stores the following witness vector
(xk)k∈Pa(i) for each table entry Tij(xi, xj) that is 1: if k ∈ Pa1(i, xi), then xk =
BRk(i, xi), otherwise, xk = σ(xiwki). The downstream phase ends at the root node
z, and z computes a unary table Tz(xz) such that Tz(xz) = 1 if and only if there
exists a witness vector (xk)k∈Pa(z) such that Tkz(xk, xz) = 1 for all k ∈ Pa(z) and xz
is a best-response of z to (xk)k∈Pa(z).
The computation of the table at each node, which runs in O(d) time, dominates the
time complexity of the downstream phase. We visit every node exactly once. So, the
total running time of the downstream phase is O(nd). Note that if there does not
exist any PSNE in the game then all the table entries computed by some node will
be 0.
2. Upstream phase. In the upstream phase, each node sends instructions to its parents
about which actions to play, along with the action that the node itself is playing. The
upstream phase begins at the root node z. For any table entry Tz(xz) = 1, z decides
to play xz itself and instructs each of its parents to play the action in the witness
vector associated with Tz(xz) = 1. At an intermediate node i, suppose that its child
j is playing xj and instruct i to play xi. The node i looks up the witness vector
(xk)k∈Pa(i) associated with Tij(xi, xj) = 1 and instructs its parents to play according
to that witness vector. This process propagates upward, and when we reach all the
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leaf nodes, we obtain a PSNE for the game. Note that we can find a PSNE in this
phase if and only if there exists one.
In the upstream phase, each node sends O(d) instructions to its parents. Thus, the
upstream phase takes O(nd) time, and the whole algorithm takes O(nd) time.
4.4 Hardness Results
Computational problems are often classified into complexity classes according to their hard-
ness. Some of the hardest classes of problems are NP-complete problems, co-NP-complete
problems, and #P-complete problems (Garey and Johnson, 1979). In this section, we show
that many of the computational problems related to LIGs belong to these hard classes.
First, computing PSNE in a general graphical game is known to be computationally
hard (Gottlob et al., 2005). However, that result does not imply intractability of our
problem, nor do the proofs seem easily adaptable to our case. LIGs are a special type of
graphical game with quadratic payoffs, or in other words a graphical, parametric polyma-
trix game (Janovskaja, 1968), and thus have a more succinct representation than general
graphical games (O(nd) in contrast to O(n2d), where d is the maximum degree of a node).
Next, we show that various interesting computational questions on LIGs are intractable,
unless P = NP.
We settle the central hardness question on LIGs (and also on 2-action polymatrix games)
in 1(a) below. Related to the most-influential-nodes problem formulation, 1(b) states that
given a subset of players, it is NP-complete to decide whether there exists a PSNE in which
these players adopt the new behavior. We present a similar result in 1(c).
A prime feature of our formulation of the most-influential-nodes problem is the unique-
ness of the desired stable outcome when the most influential nodes adopt their behavior
according to the desired stable outcome. We show in (2) that deciding whether a given set
of players fulfills this criterion is co-NP-complete.
As we will see later, in order to compute a set of the most influential nodes, it suffices
to be able to count the number of PSNE of an LIG (to be more specific, it suffices to count
the number of PSNE extensions for a given partial assignment to the players’ actions). We
show in (3) that this problem is #P-complete. Note that the #P-completeness result for
LIGs even with star structure is in contrast to the polynomial-time counterpart for general
graphical games with tree graphs, for which not only deciding the existence of a PSNE
is in P, but also counting PSNE on general graphical games with tree graphs is in P. To
better appreciate this result, consider the representation sizes of LIGs and tree-structured
graphical games, which are linear and exponential in the maximum degree, respectively.
Below, we first summarize the hardness results with an outline of proof, followed by the
complete proof of each individual statement.
Theorem 4.5. 1. It is NP-complete to decide the following questions in LIGs.
(a) Does there exist a PSNE?
(b) Given a designated non-empty set of players, does there exist a PSNE consistent
with those players playing 1?
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(c) Given a number k ≥ 1, does there exist a PSNE with at least k players playing
1?
2. Given an LIG and a designated non-empty set of players, it is co-NP-complete to
decide if there exists a unique PSNE with those players playing 1.
3. It is #P-complete to count the number of PSNE, even for special classes of the un-
derlying graph, such as a bipartite or a star graph.
Proof Sketch. The complete proofs appear immediately following this proof sketch. The
proof of 1(a) reduces the 3-SAT problem to an LIG that consists of a player for each clause
and each variable of the 3-SAT instance. The influence factors among these players are
designed such that the LIG instance possesses a PSNE if and only if the 3-SAT instance
has a satisfying assignment. Since the underlying graph of the LIG instance is always
bipartite, we obtain as a corollary that the NP-completeness of that existence problem
holds even for LIGs on bipartite graphs.
The proofs of 1(b), 1(c), and 2 use reductions from the monotone one-in-three SAT
problem. For 1(b), given a monotone one-in-three SAT instance I, we construct an LIG
instance J having a player for each clause and each variable of I. Again, we design the
influence factors in such a way that I is satisfiable if and only if J has a PSNE. The
reduction for 1(c) builds upon that of 1(b) with specifically designed extra players and
additional connectivity in the LIG instance. Again, the gadgets used in the proof of 1(c)
are extended for the proof of 2.
The proof of 3 uses reductions from the 3-SAT and the #KNAPSACK problem. The
reduction from the 3-SAT problem is the same as that used in 1(a), and proof of the #P-
hardness of the bipartite case is by showing that the number of solutions to the 3-SAT
instance is the same as the number of PSNE of the LIG instance. On the other hand, to
prove the claim of #P-completeness of counting PSNEs of LIGs having star graphs, we give
a reduction from the #KNAPSACK problem. Given a #KNAPSACK instance, we create
an LIG instance with a star structure among the players and with specifically designed
influence factors such that the number of PSNE of the LIG instance is the same as the
number of solutions to the #KNAPSACK instance.
Complete Proofs of Hardness Results
To enhance the clarity of the proofs we reduced existing NP-complete problems to LIGs
with binary actions {0, 1}, instead of {−1, 1}. We next show, via a linear transformation,
that one can reduce any LIG with actions {0, 1} to an LIG with the same underlying graph,
but with actions {−1, 1}.
Reduction from {0, 1}-action LIG to {−1, 1}-action LIG. Consider any {0, 1}-action
LIG instance I, where w and b denote the influence factors and the thresholds, respectively
(see Definition 3.6). We next construct a {−1, 1}-action LIG instance J with the same
players that are in I and with influence factors w′ji ≡ wji2 (for any i and any j 6= i),
thresholds b′i ≡ bi −
∑
j 6=i
wji
2 (for any i). We show that x is a PSNE of I if and only if x
′
is a PSNE of J , where x′i = 2xi − 1 for any i.
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By definition, x is a PSNE of I if and only if for any player i,
xi
∑
j 6=i
xjwji − bi
 ≥ (1− xi)
∑
j 6=i
xjwji − bi

⇔ (2xi − 1)
∑
j 6=i
xjwji − bi
 ≥ 0
⇔ x′i
∑
j 6=i
x′j + 1
2
wji − bi
 ≥ 0
⇔ x′i
∑
j 6=i
x′j
wji
2
−
bi −∑
j 6=i
wji
2
 ≥ 0
⇔ x′i
∑
j 6=i
x′jw
′
ji − b′i
 ≥ 0,
which is the equivalent statement of x′ being a PSNE of J .
Theorem 4.6. It is NP-complete to decide if there exists a PSNE in an LIG.
Proof. Since we can verify whether a joint action is a PSNE or not in polynomial time, the
problem is in NP. We use a reduction from the 3-SAT problem to show that the problem
is NP-hard.
Let I be an instance of the 3-SAT problem. Suppose that I has m clauses and n
variables. For any variable i, we define Ci to be the set of clauses in which i appears, and
for any clause k, we define Vk to be the set of variables appearing in clause k. For any
clause k and any variable i ∈ Vk, let lk,i be 1 if i appears in k in non-negated form and 0
otherwise. We now build an LIG instance J from I. In this game, every clause as well as
every variable is a player. Each clause k has arcs to variables in Vk, and each variable i
has arcs to clauses in Ci. The structure of the graph is illustrated in Figure 2. We next
define the thresholds of the players and the influence factors on the arcs. For any clause k,
let its threshold be 1 −  −∑i∈Vk(1 − lk,i). Here,  is a constant, and 0 <  < 1. For any
variable i let its threshold be
∑
k∈Ci(1 − 2lk,i). The weight on the arc from any clause k
to any variable i ∈ Vk is defined to be 1− 2lk,i, and that from any variable i to any clause
k ∈ Ci is 2lk,i − 1. We denote the action of any clause k by zk ∈ {0, 1} and that of any
variable i by xi ∈ {0, 1}.
First, we prove that if there exists a satisfying truth assignment in I then there exists
a PSNE in J . Consider any satisfying truth assignment S in I. Let the players in J choose
their actions according to their truth values in S, that is, 1 for true and 0 for false. Clearly,
every clause player is playing 1. Next, we show that every player in J is playing its best
response under this choice of actions.
We now show that no clause has incentive to play 0, given that the other players do
not change their actions. In the solution S to I, every clause has a literal that is true.
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Figure 2: Illustration of the structure of an LIG instance from a 3-SAT instance (each
undirected edge represents two arcs of opposite directions between the same two nodes).
In this example, the 3-SAT instance is (i1 ∨ i2 ∨ i3) ∧ (¬i2 ∨ i3 ∨ i4) ∧ (¬i3 ∨ i4 ∨ ¬i5).
Therefore, in J every clause k has some variable i ∈ Vk such that xi = lk,i. We have to
show that the total influence on k is at least the threshold of k:∑
i∈Vk
xi (2lk,i − 1) ≥ 1− −
∑
i∈Vk
(1− lk,i)
⇔
∑
i∈Vk
(xi (2lk,i − 1) + (1− lk,i)) ≥ 1− 
⇔
∑
i∈Vk
(xilk,i + (1− xi) (1− lk,i)) ≥ 1− .
Since for some i ∈ Vk, xi = lk,i, the above inequality holds strictly, that is,∑
i∈Vk
(xilk,i + (1− xi) (1− lk,i)) > 1− .
Therefore, every clause k must play 1.
We need to show that no variable player has incentive to deviate, given that the
other players do not change their actions. The total influence on any variable player i
is
∑
k∈Ci zk(1− 2lk,i) =
∑
k∈Ci(1− 2lk,i) (since zr = 1 for every clause r). The threshold of
i is
∑
k∈Ci(1 − 2lk,i). Thus, every variable player i is indifferent between choosing actions
1 and 0 and has no incentive to deviate.
We now consider the reverse direction, that is, given a PSNE in J we show that there
exists a satisfying assignment in I. We first show that at any PSNE, every clause must
play 1. If this is not the case, suppose, for a contradiction, that for some clause r, zr = 0.
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Since r’s best response is 0 (this is a PSNE), we obtain∑
i∈Vr
xi(2lr,i − 1) ≤ 1− −
∑
i∈Vr
(1− lr,i)
⇔
∑
i∈Vr
(xilr,i + (1− xi)(1− lr,i)) ≤ 1− .
Therefore, for every variable player j ∈ Vr, xj 6= lr,j . Furthermore, for any j ∈ Vr, j
does not have any incentive to deviate. Using these properties of a PSNE we will arrive at
a contradiction, and thereby prove that zr must be 1.
Consider any variable player j ∈ Vr, and let the difference between j’s total incoming
influence and its threshold be Uj . We get
Uj =
∑
k∈Cj
zk(1− 2lk,j)−
∑
k∈Cj
(1− 2lk,j) =
∑
k∈Cj
((1− zk)(2lk,j − 1))
⇔ Uj =
∑
k∈Cj
((1− zk)(2lk,j − 1)1[lk,j = 1]) +
∑
k∈Cj
((1− zk)(2lk,j − 1)1[lk,j = 0])
⇔ Uj =
∑
k∈Cj
((1− zk)1[lk,j = 1])−
∑
k∈Cj
((1− zk)1[lk,j = 0]).
At any PSNE, if xj = 1 then Uj ≥ 0; otherwise, Uj ≤ 0. Thus, the best response
condition for variable j gives us∑
k∈Cj
((1− zk)1[lk,j = xj ]) ≥
∑
k∈Cj
((1− zk)1[lk,j 6= xj ])
⇔
∑
k∈Cj−{r}
((1− zk)1[lk,j = xj ]) + (1− zr)1[lr,j = xj ] ≥
∑
k∈Cj−{r}
((1− zk)1[lk,j 6= xj ]) + (1− zr)1[lr,j 6= xj ]
⇔
∑
k∈Cj−{r}
((1− zk)1[lk,j = xj ]) ≥
∑
k∈Cj−{r}
((1− zk)1[lk,j 6= xj ]) + 1, since lr,j 6= xj .
The above inequality cannot be true, because the left hand side is always 0 (if lk,j = xj
then zk must be 1 at any PSNE), and the right hand side is ≥ 1. Thus, we obtained a
contradiction, and zr cannot be 0.
So far, we showed that at any PSNE zk = 1 for any clause player k. To complete the
proof, we now show that for every clause player k, there exists a variable player i ∈ Vk such
that xi = lk,i. If we can show this then we can translate the semantics of the actions in J
to the truth values in I and thereby obtain a satisfying truth assignment for I.
Suppose, for the sake of a contradiction, that for some clause k and for all variable
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i ∈ Vk, xi 6= lk,i. Since zk = 1, we find that∑
i∈Vk
xi(2lk,i − 1) ≥ 1− −
∑
i∈Vk
(1− lk,i)
⇔
∑
i∈Vk
(xilk,i + (1− xi)(1− lk,i)) ≥ 1− 
⇔ 0 ≥ 1− , which gives us the desired contradiction.
The proof of Theorem 4.6 reduces the 3-SAT problem to an LIG where the underlying
graph is bipartite. Thus, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 4.7. It is NP-complete to decide if there exists a PSNE in an LIG on a bipartite
graph.
The proof of Theorem 4.6 directly leads us to the following result that the counting
version of the problem is #P-complete.
Corollary 4.8. It is #P-complete to count the number of PSNE of an LIG.
Proof. The proof follows from the proof of Theorem 4.6. Membership of this counting
problem in #P is easy to see. Using the same reduction as in the proof of Theorem 4.6, we
find that each satisfying truth assignment (among the 2n possibilities) to the variables of the
3-SAT instance I can be mapped to a distinct PSNE of the LIG instance J . Furthermore,
we saw that at each PSNE in J , every clause player must play 1. Thus, for each of the 2n
joint strategies of the variable players (while having the clause players play 1), if the joint
strategy is a PSNE then we can map it to a distinct satisfying assignment in I. Moreover,
each of these two mappings are the inverse of the other. Therefore, the number of satisfying
assignments of I is the same as the number of PSNE in J . Since counting the number of
satisfying assignments of a 3-SAT instance is #P-complete, counting the number of PSNE
of an LIG, even on a bipartite graph, is also #P-complete.
While Corollary 4.8 shows the hardness of counting the number of PSNE of an LIG on
a general graph, we can show the same hardness result even on special classes of graphs,
such as star graphs:
Theorem 4.9. Counting the number of PSNE of an LIG on a star graph is #P-complete.
Proof. Since we can verify whether a joint strategy is a PSNE in polynomial time, the
problem is in #P. We will show #P-hardness using a reduction from #KNAPSACK, which
is the problem of counting the number of feasible solutions in a 0-1 Knapsack problem:
Given n items, the weight ai ∈ Z+ of each item i, and the maximum capacity of the sack
W ∈ Z+, #KNAPSACK asks how many ways we can pick the items to satisfy ∑ni=1 aixi ≤
W , where xi = 1 if the i-th item has been picked, and xi = 0 otherwise. Given an instance
I of the #KNAPSACK problem with n items, we construct an LIG instance J on a star
graph with n+ 1 nodes. Let us label the nodes v0, ..., vn, where v0 is connected to all other
nodes. We define the influence factors among the nodes as follows: the influence of v0 to
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any other node vi, wv0vi = 1, and the influence in the reverse direction, wviv0 = −ai. The
threshold of v0 is defined as bv0 = −W , and the threshold of every other node vi, bvi = 1.
We denote the action of any node vi by xi ∈ {0, 1}. Note that at any PSNE of J , v0 must
play 1. Otherwise, if v0 plays 0 then all other nodes must also play 0, and this implies that
v0 must play 1, giving us a contradiction.
We prove that the number of feasible solutions in I is the same as the number of PSNE
in J . For any (x1, ..., xn) ∈ {0, 1}n in I, we map each xi to the action selected by vi in J , for
1 ≤ i ≤ n. As proved earlier, the action of v0 must be 1 at any PSNE. Furthermore, when
v0 plays 1, all other nodes become indifferent between playing 0 and 1. Thus, the number
of PSNE in J is the number of ways of satisfying the inequality
∑n
i=1wviv0xi ≥ bv0 , which
is equivalent to
∑n
i=1 aixi ≤W . Thus the number of PSNE in J is equal to the number of
feasible solutions in I.
The following three theorems show the hardness of several other variants of the problem
of computing a PSNE of an LIG.
Theorem 4.10. Given an LIG, along with a designated subset of k players in it, it is
NP-complete to decide if there exists a PSNE consistent with those k players playing the
action 1.
Proof. It is easy to see that the problem is in NP, since a succinct yes certificate can be
specified by a joint action of the players, where the designated players play 1, and it can
be verified in polynomial time whether this is a PSNE or not.
We show a reduction from the monotone one-in-three SAT problem, a known NP-
complete problem, to prove that the problem is NP-hard. An instance of the monotone
one-in-three SAT problem consists of a set of m clauses and a set of n variables, where
each clause has exactly three variables. The problem asks whether there exists a truth
assignment to the variables such that each clause has exactly one variable with the truth
value of true. Given an instance of the monotone one-in-three SAT problem, we construct
an instance of LIG as follows (please refer to Figure 3 for an illustration). For each variable
we have a variable player in the game, and for each clause we have a clause player. Each
variable player has a threshold of 0, and each clause player has a threshold of , where
0 <  < 1. We now define the connectivity among the players of the game. There is
an arc with weight (or influence) −1 from a variable player u to another variable player
v if and only if, in the monotone one-in-three SAT instance, both of the corresponding
variables appear together in at least one clause. Also, for each clause t and each variable w
appearing in t, there is an arc from the variable player (corresponding to w) to the clause
player (corresponding to t) with weight 1. Furthermore, we assign k = m, and assume that
the designated set of players is the set of clause players. We also assume that the action 1 in
the LIG corresponds to the truth value of true in the monotone one-in-three SAT problem
and 0 to false.
Note that the way we constructed the LIG, at most one variable player per clause can
play the action 1 at any PSNE. To see this, assume, for contradiction, that at some PSNE
two variable players u and v, both connected to the same clause t, are playing the action
1. Then the influence on either of these two variable players is ≤ −1, which is less than
its threshold 0, and this contradicts the PSNE assumption. Also, note that at any PSNE,
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Figure 3: Illustration of the NP-hardness reduction of Theorem 4.10. The monotone one-
in-three SAT instance is (i1 ∨ i2 ∨ i3) ∧ (i2 ∨ i3 ∨ i4) ∧ (i3 ∨ i4 ∨ i5). The threshold of each
variable player is 0, and that of each clause player is .
each clause player will play the action 1 if and only if at least one of the variable players
connected to it plays 1.
First, we show that if there exists a solution to the monotone one-in-three SAT instance
then there exists a PSNE in the LIG where the set of clause players play 1. A solution to
the monotone one-in-three SAT problem implies that each clause has the truth value of true
with exactly one of its variables having the truth value of true. We claim that in the LIG,
every player playing according to its truth assignment, is a PSNE. First, observe that the
variable players do not have any incentive to change their actions, since the ones playing 1
are indifferent between playing 0 and 1 (because the total influence = 0 = threshold) and
the remaining must play 0 (because the total influence is ≤ −1 < threshold). Since each
clause has one of its variables playing 1, each clause player must play 1 (because 1 > ).
This concludes the first part of the proof.
We next show that if there exists a PSNE with the clause players playing 1 then there
exists a solution to the monotone one-in-three SAT instance. Consider any PSNE where the
clause players are playing 1. Since each clause player is playing 1, at least one of the three
variable players connected to the clause player is playing 1. Furthermore, as we showed
earlier, no two variables belonging to the same clause can play 1 at any PSNE. Thus, for
each clause player, at most one variable player connected to it is playing 1. Therefore, for
every clause player, exactly one variable player connected to it is playing 1. Translating
the semantics of the actions to the truth values of the variables and the clauses, we obtain
a solution to the monotone one-in-three SAT instance.
Theorem 4.11. Given an LIG and a number k ≥ 1, it is NP-complete to decide if there
exists a PSNE with at least k players playing the action 1.
Proof. Clearly, the problem is in NP, since we can verify a whether a joint action is a PSNE
or not in polynomial time.
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For the proof of NP-hardness, once again we show a reduction from the monotone one-
in-three SAT problem. Please see Figure 4 for an illustration. Given an instance I of
the monotone one-in-three SAT problem, we first build an LIG as shown in the proof of
Theorem 4.10. We then add m(m−1) additional players, named extra players, to the game,
where m is the number of clauses in I. Each of these extra players is assigned a threshold
of , where 0 <  < 1. The way we connect the extra players to the other players is as
follows: From each clause player we introduce m − 1 arcs, each weighted by 1, to m − 1
distinct extra players. That is, no two clause players have arcs to the same extra player.
Finally, we set k = m2. We denote this instance of LIG by J .
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Figure 4: Illustration of the NP-hardness reduction of Theorem 4.11.
We prove that for any solution to I there exists a PSNE with k players playing 1
in J . Suppose that each of the variable and clause players is playing according to their
corresponding truth value in the solution to I. None of the variable players has any incentive
to change its action, because exactly one variable player connected to each clause player
is playing 1. For the same reason, the clause players, each playing 1, also do not have
any incentive to deviate. Considering the extra players, each of these players must play
1, because each of the clause players is playing 1. The total number of clause and extra
players is k. Therefore, we have a Nash equilibrium where at least k players are playing 1.
On the other direction, consider any PSNE in J with at least k players playing 1. We
claim that all the clause and extra players are playing 1 at this PSNE. If this is not true
then at least one of these players is playing 0. This implies that at least one clause player is
playing 0, because conditioned on a PSNE, whenever a clause player plays 1, all the extra
players connected to it also plays 1. Furthermore, by our construction at most one of the
variable players connected to each clause player can play 1. So, the total number of players
playing 1 is ≤ (m−1)(m+1) < m2 (at most m−1 clause players are playing 1, and for each
of these clause players, m − 1 extra players, 1 variable player, and the clause player itself
are playing 1), which contradicts our assumption that m2 players are playing 1. Thus, at
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any PSNE with k players playing 1, it must be the case that every clause player is playing
1. This leads us to a solution for I.
Theorem 4.12. Given an LIG and a designated set of k ≥ 1 players, it is co-NP-complete
to decide if there exists a unique PSNE with those players playing the action 1.
Proof. Two distinct joint actions (PSNE), each having the same k players playing 1, can
serve as a succinct no certificate, and we can check in polynomial time if these two joint
actions are indeed PSNE or not.
Suppose that I is an instance of the monotone one-in-three SAT problem. We reduce I
to an instance J of our problem in polynomial time and show that J has a “no” answer if
and only if I has a “yes” answer.
Given I, we start constructing an LIG in the same way as in Theorem 4.10 (see Figures 5
and 3). Assign k = m2. Now, add two new players, named the all-satisfied-verification
player and the none-satisfied-verification player, which have threshold values of m−  and
−, respectively. We add arcs from every clause player to these two new players, and the
arcs to the all-satisfied-verification player are weighted by 1, and the ones to the none-
satisfied-verification player are weighted by −1.
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Figure 5: Illustration of the NP-hardness reduction (Theorem 4.12). For the monotone
one-in-three SAT instance of Figure 3, we first obtain the same construction as in The-
orem 4.10. We add two extra players, the all-satisfied-verification player and the none-
satisfied-verification player, whose tasks are to verify if all clauses are satisfied and if no
clause is satisfied, respectively. These two players are connected to m2 extra players.
In addition, add k = m2 new players, named extra players, and let these players con-
stitute the set of designated players. Assign a threshold value of  to each of these extra
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players, and introduce new arcs, each with weight 1, from the all-satisfied-verification player
and the none-satisfied-verification player to every extra player. The resulting LIG is the
instance J of the problem in question.
Note that at any PSNE the all-satisfied-verification player plays 1 if and only if every
clause player plays 1, and the none-satisfied-verification player plays 1 if and only if no
clause player plays 1. Furthermore, at any PSNE, each extra player plays 1 if and only
if either every clause player plays 1 or no clause player plays 1. Therefore, we find that
every extra player playing 1, the none-satisfied-verification player playing 1, and every other
player playing 0 is a PSNE, and we denote this equilibrium by E0. We claim that there
exists a different PSNE where every extra player plays 1 if and only if I has a solution.
Suppose that there exists a solution SI to I. It can be verified that making the all-
satisfied-verification player play 1, none-satisfied-verification player play 0, every extra
player play 1, and choosing the actions of the clause and the variable players according
to the corresponding truth values in SI gives us a PSNE that we call E1. Thus J has two
PSNE E0 and E1, where the k extra players play 1 in both cases.
Considering the reverse direction, suppose that there exists no solution to I. This
implies that at any PSNE in J all clause players can never play 1, otherwise we could have
translated the PSNE to a satisfying truth assignment for I. This further implies that the
all-satisfied-verification player always plays 0. The none-satisfied-verification player plays
1 if and only if none of the clause players plays 1. Thus, every extra player plays 1 if and
only if no clause player plays 1, if and only if no variable player plays 1. Therefore, E0 is
the only PSNE in J with the k extra players playing 1.
4.5 Heuristics for Computing and Counting Equilibria
The fundamental computational problem at hand is that of computing PSNE in LIGs.
We just saw that various computational questions pertaining to LIGs on general graphs,
sometimes even on bipartite graphs, are NP-hard. We now present a heuristic to compute
PSNE of an LIG on a general graph.
A natural approach to finding all the PSNE in an LIG would be to perform a backtrack-
ing search. However, a standard instantiation of the backtracking search method (Russell
and Norvig, 2003, Ch. 5) that ignores the structure of the graph would be destined to fail-
ure in practice. Thus, we need to order the node selections in a way that would facilitate
pruning the search space.
An outline of the backtracking search procedure that we used is given below. Here, the
two main additions to the standard backtracking search method are exploiting the graph,
including the influence factors, for node selection and implementing constraint propagation
by adapting the NashProp algorithm (Ortiz and Kearns, 2003) to run in polynomial time.
The first node selected by the procedure is a node with the maximum outdegree. Af-
terwards, we do not select nodes by their degrees. We rather select a node i that will most
likely show that the current partial joint action cannot lead to a PSNE and explore the
two actions of i, xi ∈ {−1, 1} in a suitable order. A good node selection heuristic that has
worked well in our experiments is to select the one that has the maximum influence on any
of the already selected nodes.
Suppose that the nodes are selected in the order 1, 2, ..., n (wlog). After selecting node
32
i+ 1 and assigning it an action xi+1, we determine if the partial joint action x1:(i+1) ≡
(x1, . . . , xi+1) can possibly lead to a PSNE and prune the corresponding search space if not.
Note that a “no” answer to this requires a proof that one of the players j, 1 ≤ j ≤ i + 1,
can never play xj according to the partial joint action x1:(i+1). A straightforward way
of doing this is to consider each player j, 1 ≤ j ≤ i + 1, and compute the quantities
γ+j ≡
∑i+1
k=1,k 6=j xkwkj +
∑n
k=i+2 |xkwkj | and γ−j ≡
∑i+1
k=1,k 6=j xkwkj −
∑n
k=i+2 |xkwkj |, and
then test if the logical expression ((γ−j > bj) ∧ xj = −1) ∨ ((γ+j < bj) ∧ xj = 1) holds,
in which case we can discard the partial joint action x1:(i+1) and prune the corresponding
search space. Furthermore, it may happen that due to x1:(i+1), the choices of some of the
not-yet-selected players became restricted. To this end, we apply NashProp (Ortiz and
Kearns, 2003) with x1:(i+1) as the starting configuration, and see if the choices of the other
players became restricted because of x1:(i+1). Although each round of updating the table
messages in NashProp takes exponential time in the maximum degree in general graphical
games, we can show in a way similar to Theorem 4.4 that we can adapt the table updates
to the case of LIGs so that it takes polynomial time.
A Divide-and-Conquer Approach
To further exploit the structure of the graph in computing the PSNE, we propose a divide-
and-conquer approach that relies on the following separation property of LIGs.
Property 4.13. Let G = (V,E) be the underlying graph of an LIG and S be a vertex
separator of G such that removing S from G results in k ≥ 2 disconnected components:
G1 = (V1, E1), ..., Gk = (Vk, Ek). Let G
′
i be the subgraph of G induced by Vi ∪ S, for
1 ≤ i ≤ k. Consider the LIGs on these (smaller) graphs G′i’s, where we retain all the
weights of the original graph, except that we treat the nodes in S to be indifferent (that is,
we remove all the incoming arcs to these nodes and set their thresholds to 0). Computing
the set of PSNE on G′i’s and then merging the PSNE (by performing outer-joins of joint
actions and testing for PSNE in the original LIG), we obtain the set of all PSNE of the
original game.
Proof Sketch. First, since the joint actions are tested for PSNE in the original LIG, the
output will never contain a joint action that is not a PSNE. Second, since the nodes in S
are made indifferent in the LIGs on G′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, no PSNE of the original LIG can get
omitted from the result of the outer-join operation.
To obtain a vertex separator, we first find an edge separator (using well-known tools
such as METIS (Karypis and Kumar, 1995)), and then convert the edge separator to a
vertex separator (by computing a maximum matching on the bipartite graph spanned by
the edge separator). We then use this vertex separator to compute PSNE of the game in the
way outlined in Property 4.13. The benefits of this approach are two-fold: (1) for graphs
that have good separation properties (such as preferential-attachment graphs), we found
this approach to be computationally effective in practice; and (2) this approach leads to an
anytime algorithm for enumerating or counting PSNE: Observe that ignoring some edges
from the edge separator may result in a smaller vertex separator, which greatly reduces the
computation time of the divide-and-conquer algorithm at the expense of producing only a
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subset of all PSNE. (The reason we obtain a subset of all PSNE is that the edges that are
ignored from the edge separator are not permanently removed from the original graph, and
that after merging, every resulting joint action is tested for PSNE in the original game,
not in the game where some of the edges were temporarily removed. As a result, some the
original PSNE may not be included in the final output. At the same time, we can never
have a joint action in the final output that is not a PSNE.) We can obtain progressively
better result as we ignore less number of edges from the edge separator.
5 Computing the Most Influential Nodes
We now focus on the problem of computing the most influential set of nodes with respect
to a specified desired PSNE and a preference for sets of minimal size. In the discussion
below, we also assume, only for the purpose of establishing and describing the equivalence
to the minimum hitting set problem (Karp, 1972), that we are given the set of all PSNE.
(As we will see, a counting routine is all that our algorithm requires, not a complete list
of PSNE.) We give a hypergraph representation of this problem that would lead us to a
logarithmic-factor approximation by a natural greedy algorithm.
(9, −1)(8, −1)(7, −1)
(6, −1)
(3, −1)
(5, −1)(4, −1)
(2, −1)(1, −1)
(9, 1)(8, 1)(7, 1)
(6, 1)(5, 1)(4, 1)
(3, 1)(2, 1)(1, 1)
Figure 6: A hypergraph representation of three PSNE in a 9-player game with binary ac-
tions. The PSNE shown here are the followings: (1,−1,−1, 1,−1,−1, 1,−1,−1) (triangle),
(−1,−1,−1,−1,−1,−1, 1, 1, 1) (rectangle), and (−1,−1,−1,−1,−1, 1,−1, 1, 1) (6-gon).
Let us start by building a hypergraph that can represent the PSNE of a binary-action
game. The nodes of this hypergraph are the player-action tuples of the game. Thus,
for an n-player, binary-action game, we have 2n nodes in the hypergraph. That is, for
each player i of the game, there are two nodes in the hypergraph: one in which i plays
−1 (tuple (i,−1), colored red in Figure 6) and the other in which i plays 1 (tuple (i, 1),
colored black). For every PSNE x we construct a hyperedge {(i, xi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. Let
us call this hypergraph the game hypergraph. By construction, a set of players S play the
same joint-action aS ∈ {−1, 1}|S| in two distinct PSNE x and y of the LIG if and only if
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both of the corresponding hyperedges ex and ey (resp.) of the game hypergraph contains
T = {(i, ai) | i ∈ S}.
We can use the above property to translate the most-influential-nodes selection prob-
lem, given all PSNE, to an equivalent combinatorial problem on the corresponding game
hypergraph H. Let ex∗ be the hyperedge in H corresponding to the desired PSNE x
∗. Let
us call ex∗ the goal hyperedge. Then the most-influential-nodes selection problem is the
problem of selecting a minimum-cardinality set of nodes T ⊆ ex∗ such that T is contained
in no other hyperedge of H (recall that we are dealing with a set-preference function that
captures the preference for sets of minimal cardinality). Let us call the latter problem the
unique hyperedge problem. Using the notation above, the equivalence relationship between
the influential nodes selection problem (given the set of all PSNE) and the unique hyper-
edge problem can be stated as follows. The set S ⊆ {1, ..., n} is a (feasible) solution to the
most-influential-nodes selection problem if and only if T = {(i, xi∗) | i ∈ S} is a (feasible)
solution to the unique hyperedge problem.
We now show that the unique hyperedge problem is equivalent to the minimum hitting
set problem. Immediate consequences of this result are that the unique hyperedge problem
is not approximable within a factor of c log h for some constant c > 0, and that it admits a
(1 + log h)-factor approximation (Raz and Safra, 1997; Johnson, 1974), where h is the total
number of PSNE.
Theorem 5.1. The unique hyperedge problem having 2n players and h hyperedges is equiv-
alent to the minimum hitting set problem having n nodes and h hyperedges.
Proof. Let us consider an instance I of the unique hyperedge problem, given by a game
hypergraph G = (V,E), where V is the set of 2n nodes and E is the set of h hyperedges,
along with a specification of the goal hyperedge ex∗ . Given I, we now construct an instance
J of the minimum hitting set problem, specified by the hypergraph G′ = (ex∗ , {ex∗} ∪ {e¯∩
ex∗ | e ∈ E and e 6= ex∗}), where e¯ indicates the complement set of the hyperedge e. Thus,
the nodes of G′ are exactly the n nodes of ex∗ and the hyperedges of it are constructed
from the complement hyperedges of G except ex∗ , which is present in both G and G
′. We
show that a set S of nodes is a feasible solution to I if and only if it is a feasible solution
to J .
If S is a feasible solution to I then S ⊆ ex∗ (because in the unique hyperedge problem,
we are only allowed to select nodes from the goal hyperedge) and S * e for any hyperedge
e 6= ex∗ of G (otherwise, the uniqueness property is violated). This implies that for any
hyperedge e 6= ex∗ of G, there exists a node v ∈ S such that v /∈ e, which further implies
that v ∈ e¯ ∩ ex∗ . Thus, every hyperedge of G′, including ex∗ , of course, has at least one
of its nodes selected in S, and therefore, S is a feasible solution to J . On the other hand,
if S is a feasible solution to J then for any hyperedge of G′, at least one of its nodes has
been selected in S. That is, for any hyperedge e 6= ex∗ of G, we have e′ ≡ e¯ ∩ ex∗ as the
corresponding complementary hyperedge in G′, and there exists a node v ∈ S such that
v ∈ e′, which implies that v /∈ e. Thus, S * e for any hyperedge e 6= ex∗ of G. Furthermore,
we have selected all the nodes of S from ex∗ of G. Thus, ex∗ is the unique hyperedge of G
containing the nodes of S.
To prove the reverse direction, we start with an instance J of the minimum hitting
set problem, specified by a hypergraph G′ = (V,E), where V is a set of n nodes and E
35
is a set of h hyperedges. Without the loss of generality, we assume that E contains the
hyperedge e∗ consisting of all the nodes of V . We now construct an instance I of the unique
hyperedge problem that has a hypergraph G with 2n nodes and h hyperedges. The node
set of G literally consists of two copies of the nodes of V , denoted by V × {1,−1}. We
now construct the hyperedges of G. For each hyperedge e 6= e∗ of the minimum hitting set
instance, we include a hyperedge e′ ≡ e¯ × {1} ∪ e × {−1} in G, and for the hyperedge e∗
of J , we include the hyperedge e∗ × {1} in G. Thus, the game hypergraph can be defined
as G = (V × {1,−1}, {e∗ × {1}} ∪ {e¯ × {1} ∪ e × {−1} | e ∈ E and e 6= e∗}). Finally,
we designate e∗ × {1} as the goal hyperedge of I. We will show that S ⊆ V is a feasible
solution to J if and only if S × {1} is a feasible solution to the unique hyperedge problem
instance I. The set S is a feasible solution to J if and only if for every hyperedge e 6= e∗
of G′, there exists a node v ∈ S such that v ∈ e (note that S ⊆ e∗). This is equivalent to
saying that for every hyperedge e × {1} 6= e∗ × {1} of G, there exists a node v ∈ S × {1}
such that v /∈ e×{1}. Using the fact that S×{1} ⊆ e∗×{1}, S×{1} is a feasible solution
to I.
The adaptation of the well-known hitting set approximation algorithm (Ausiello et al.,
1980) for our problem can be outlined as follows: At each step, select the least-degree node
v of the goal hyperedge, remove the hyperedges that do not contain v, remove v from the
game hypergraph, and include v in the solution set, until the goal hyperedge becomes the
last remaining hyperedge in the hypergraph. In the context of the original LIG, at every
round, this algorithm is essentially picking the node whose assignment would reduce the
set of PSNE consistent with the current partial assignment the most. Hence, the algorithm
only requires a subroutine to count the PSNE extensions for some given partial assignment
to the players’ actions, not an a priori full list or enumeration of all the PSNE. Of course,
it may require a complete list of PSNE in the worst case.
6 Experimental Results
We performed empirical studies on several types of LIGs, namely, (1) random LIGs (Erdo¨s-
Re´nyi and uniformly random), (2) preferential-attachment LIGs, and (3) LIGs created to
model potential interactions in two different real-world scenarios: interactions among U.S.
Supreme Court justices and those among U.S. senators. While the first two types of LIGs
are synthetic/artificial, the latter two are the result of inferring the LIGs from real-world
data using machine learning techniques (Honorio and Ortiz, 2013).
The reason for experimenting with synthetic LIGs using Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (Erdos and Re´nyi,
1961) and uniformly random graphs is that those types of network-generation techniques are
the most basic available. They serve as precursors to the more sophisticated preferential-
attachment graphs, which capture the heavy-tailed degree distribution often observed in
real-world networks (Albert and Baraba´si, 2002).
Here is our overall plan for this section. For the synthetic games (random LIGs and
preferential-attachment LIGs), we generate game instances by varying the appropriate pa-
rameters, such as the size of the game, and evaluate both the number of PSNE of these
games and the computation time of our algorithm. We also compute the most influential
nodes in these games using our approximation algorithm and compare it to the optimal (i.e.,
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minimum-cardinality) set of most-influential nodes. For the real-world games on Supreme
Court rulings and congressional voting, we discuss how we learn these games from data
(Honorio and Ortiz, 2013), and how we compute the set of PSNE and identify the most in-
fluential nodes. For the congressional voting case, we also adapt the simple, greedy selection
approximation algorithm to identify most-influential individuals using the cascade model in
the diffusion setting, as described by Kleinberg (2007), to use as a heuristic to solve specific
instances of the most-influential-nodes problem formulation in our context. We compare
and contrast the output of our approximation algorithm and that of the diffusion-based
heuristic resulting from the adaptation.
6.1 Random Influence Games
We began our experiments by generating instances of random graphs using the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi
model (Erdos and Re´nyi, 1961). We varied the number of nodes, from 10 to 30, and the
probability of including an edge. Assuming binary actions, 1 and −1, we chose the threshold
bi and the influence factors wji of the incoming arcs of each node i uniformly at random
from a unit hyperball. That is, for each node i, b2i +
∑
j∈N(i)w
2
ji = 1, where N(i) is the set
of nodes having arcs toward i. Then, we chose the sign of each threshold, as well as each
weight, to be either + or − with 0.5 probability. We applied the heuristic given earlier to
find the set of all PSNE in these random graphs. Our experimental results show that in all
of these random LIGs, the number of PSNE is almost always very small—usually one or
two, and sometimes none.
We also studied LIGs on uniformly random directed graphs. While constructing the
random graphs, we have independently chosen each arc with probability 0.50, and assigned
it a weight of −1 with probability p (named flip probability) and 1 with probability 1− p.
Several interesting findings emerged from our study of this parameterized family of LIGs
on uniformly random graphs. Appendix C summarizes the results in tabular form. For
various flip probabilities, we independently generated 100 uniformly random graphs of 25
nodes each. For each of these random graphs, we first computed all PSNE using our
heuristic. We then applied the greedy approximation algorithm to obtain a set of the most
influential nodes in each graph and compared the approximation results to the optimal set.
Unless p is either 0 or 1, one cannot guarantee the existence of a PSNE. In our ex-
periments, we found that, in fact, for p = 0.50, the probability of not having a PSNE is
highest (around 5%), and as we go toward the two extremes of p, the probability of not
having a PSNE decreases. We report only the games with at least one equilibrium in this
experimental study, because it is these games we care about for computing the most in-
fluential nodes. Another interesting finding about the number of PSNE is that it is very
small when p = 0, that is when all the arcs have weight 1, and it is large when p = 1,
although quite small (on average, a fraction 5.81 × 10−6 ≈ 2−17.29) relative to the total
number of 225 possible joint actions. Also, the average number of nodes of the search tree
that the backtracking method visits per equilibrium computation is relatively small on the
two extremes of p, compared with p around 0.5. Note that the backtracking method does a
very good job with respect to the number of search-tree nodes visited in searching the 225
space. In fact, our experiments show that the addition of the NashProp-based heuristic
on top of the node selection heuristic considerably speeds up the search. Finally, we found
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that although the approximation algorithm has a logarithmic factor worst-case bound, the
results of the approximation algorithm are most often very close to the optimal solution.
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Figure 7: PSNE computation on random LIGs. The vertical bars denote 95% confidence
intervals.
Figure 7 shows that the number of PSNE usually increases if we have more negative-
weighted arcs than positive ones; although the number of PSNE is still very small relative
to the maximum potential number, as remarked earlier. We also found once again that
although the approximation algorithm for the influential-nodes selection problem has a
logarithmic factor worst-case bound, the result of the approximation algorithm is most
often very close to the optimal solution. For example, for the random games having all
negative influence factors, in 87% of the trials the approximate solution size ≤ optimal
size +1, and in 99% of the trials the approximate solution size ≤ optimal size +2 (see
Appendix C for more details in a tabular form).
6.2 Preferential-Attachment LIGs
We also experimented with LIGs based on preferential-attachment graphs primarily because
of its power to explain the structure of many real-world social networks in a generative
fashion (Albert and Baraba´si, 2002). In order to construct these graphs, we started with
three nodes in a triangle and then progressively added each node to the graph, connecting
it with three existing nodes with probabilities proportionate to the degrees. We made
each connection bidirectional and imposed the same weighting scheme as above: with flip
probability p, the weight of an arc is −1 and with probability 1 − p it is 1. We set the
threshold of each node to 0. We observe that for 0 < p < 1, these games have very few
PSNE, while for p = 0 and p = 1 the number of PSNE is considerably larger than that.
Furthermore, these games show very good separation properties, making the computation
amenable to the divide-and-conquer approach. We show the average number of PSNE and
the average computation time for graphs of sizes 20 to 50 nodes in Figure 8 for p = 1 (each
average is over 20 trials). Note that in contrast to uniformly random LIGs, preferential-
attachment graphs show an exponential increase in the number of PSNE as the number of
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nodes increase, although the number of PSNE is still a very small fraction of the maximum
potential number.
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Figure 8: PSNE computation on preferential-attachment LIGs (y-axis is in log scale). The
vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals.
6.3 Illustration: Supreme Court Rulings
We used our model to analyze the influence among the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS), 14 is the highest federal court of the
judicial branch of the government. (The other branches of government are the executive
branch, lead by the President, and the legislative branch, represented by Congress.) The
SCOTUS is the main interpreter of the Constitution and has final say on the constitutional-
ity of any federal law created by the legislative branch or any action taken by the executive
branch. It consists of nine justices—a chief justice and eight associate justices. We chose to
study the SCOTUS in the context of influence games because this is an application domain
where the strategic aspects of influence seem of prime importance.
There are two distinctive features that make our approach particularly suitable to the
SCOTUS domain. First, we can model the individual outcomes (in this case, the decisions
of the justices on each case) as outcomes of a one-shot non-cooperative game (an LIG in
our case). Second, the physical interpretation of the diffusion process is not as clear in this
setting as it is in applications like viral marketing.
6.3.1 Data
We obtained data from the Supreme Court Database. 15 Although the database captures
fine-grained details of the cases, we only focused on the variable varVote. Again, the votes
of the justices are not simple yes/no instances. Instead, each vote can have eight distinct
values. However, for practical purposes, we can attach a simple yes/no interpretation to
the values of the votes, as shown in Table 1.
14http://www.supremecourtus.gov
15http://scdb.wustl.edu/
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varVote Original Meaning Our Interpretation
1 Voted with majority Yes
2 Dissent No
3 Regular concurrence Yes
4 Special concurrence Yes
5 Judgment of the Court Yes
6 Dissent from a denial or dismissal of cer-
tiorari, or dissent from summary affirma-
tion of an appeal (Interpreted as absent
from voting in final outcome)
Majority
7 Jurisdictional dissent (Interpreted as ab-
sent from voting in final outcome)
Majority
8 Justice participated in an equally divided
vote
—
Table 1: Interpretation of Votes
In Table 1, “majority” in the third column signifies that we interpreted the correspond-
ing justice’s vote as yes or no, whichever occurs most among the other justices. Also, among
the natural courts we studied, we did not encounter voting instances where varVote has a
value of 8.
We now present our study of the natural court (with timeline 1994–2004) comprising of
Justices WH Rehnquist, JP Stevens, SD O’Connor, A Scalia, AM Kennedy, DH Souter, C
Thomas, RB Ginsburg, and SG Breyer.
6.3.2 Learning LIG
The data for the above natural court consists of 971 voting instances (each voting instance
consists of the votes of all nine justices). Many instances (i.e., voting patterns) appear
repeatedly in the data set, of course. For example, the most repeated instance consists
of all the justices voting yes, occurring 438 times. The second most repeated instance,
occurring 85 times, consists of five of the justices, namely, Justices Scalia, Thomas, Rehn-
quist, O’Connor, and Kennedy voting yes, and the remaining justices voting no. We used
L2-regularized logistic regression (simultaneous classification) to learn an LIG from this
data. The influence factors and the biases of the learned LIG appear in tabular form in
Appendix C. Figure 9 shows a pictorial representation of the same LIG.
The learned LIG represents 589 of the 971 voting instances as PSNE. As expected, it
represents the frequently repeated voting instances (such as the ones mentioned above).
Figure 10 shows a graphical representation of the LIG. We clustered the nodes based on
the traditional perception that Justices Scalia, Thomas, Rehnquist, and O’Connor are
“conservative;” Justices Breyer, Souter, Ginsburg, and Stevens are “liberal;” and Justice
Kennedy is a “moderate.” As illustrated in Figure 10, negative influence factors occur only
between players of two different clusters.
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Figure 9: Pictorial representation of LIG learned from data—the non-diagonal elements
represent influence factors and the diagonal elements biases. The numbering of the players
(from 1 to 9) corresponds to the justices in this order: Justices A Scalia, C Thomas, WH
Rehnquist, SD O’Connor, AM Kennedy, SG Breyer, DH Souter, RB Ginsburg, and JP
Stevens. The darker the color of a cell, the more negative the corresponding number. For
example, the most negative number (−0.2634) occurs in cell (5, 5) (i.e., the bias of Justice
Kennedy). The most positive number (0.4282) occurs in cell (1, 2) (i.e., the influence factor
from Justice Scalia to Justice Thomas) and the number closest to zero is 0.001 in cell (2, 4)
(i.e., the influence factor from Justice Thomas to Justice Kennedy).
6.3.3 Most Influential Nodes
Analysis of the PSNE of this LIG shows that there is a set of two nodes that is “most
influential” with respect to achieving the objective of every justice voting yes. This most-
influential set consists of one node from the set {Scalia, Thomas} and another one from the
set {Breyer, Souter, Ginsburg, Stevens}. Furthermore, any one node from the set {Breyer,
Souter, Ginsburg, Stevens} is alone most-influential with respect to achieving the objective
of a 5-4 vote mentioned above (i.e., the second most repeated instance in the data).
6.4 Illustration: Congressional Voting
We further illustrate our computational scheme in another real-world scenario—the U.S.
Congress—where the strategic aspects of the agents’ behavior are also of prime importance.
We particularly focus on the U.S. Senate, which consists of 100 senators; two senators for
each of the 50 U.S. states. Together, they form the most important unit of the legislative
branch of the U.S. Federal Government.
We first learned the LIGs among the senators of the 101st and the 110th U.S. Congress (Hon-
orio and Ortiz, 2013). The 101st Congress LIG consists of 100 nodes, each representing a
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Figure 10: Graphical representation of LIG learned from data. Larger node sizes indicate
higher thresholds (more stubborn). Black and red arcs indicate positive or negative influ-
ence factors, respectively. While the learned LIG is a complete graph, we are only showing
approximately half of the arcs (i.e., we are not showing the “weakest” arcs in this graph).
senator, and 936 weighted arcs among these nodes. On the other hand, the 110th Congress
LIG has the same number of nodes, but it is a little sparser than the 101st one, having 762
arcs. In these LIGs, each node can play one of the two actions: 1 (yes vote) and −1 (no
vote). Figure 11 shows a bird’s eye view of the 110th Congress LIG, while Figure 12 shows
a magnified part of it.
First, we applied the divide-and-conquer algorithm that exploits the nice separation
properties of these LIGs, to find the set of all PSNE (we precompute the whole set of PSNE
for convenience; as discussed earlier, counting alone is sufficient). We obtained a total of
143,601 PSNE for the 101st Congress graph and 310,608 PSNE for the 110th. Note that the
number of PSNE in these games is extremely small (e.g., a fraction 2.45× 10−25 ≈ 2−81.76
for the 110th Congress) relative to the maximum possible 2100 joint actions. Regarding
computation time, solving the 110th Congress using the divide-and-conquer approach takes
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Figure 11: LIG for the 110th U.S. Congress: darker color of nodes represent higher threshold
(more stubborn); thicker arcs denote influence factors of higher magnitude (only half of
the original arcs with the highest magnitude of influence factors are shown here); circles
denote most-influential senators; rectangles denote cut nodes used in the divide-and-conquer
algorithm. Figure 12 shows the shaded part for better visualization.
about seven hours, whereas solving the same without this approach, simply relying on the
backtracking search, takes about 15 hours on a modern quad-core desktop computer.
Next, we computed the most influential senators using the approximation algorithm
outlined at the end of Section 5. We obtained a solution of size five for the 101st Congress
graph, which we verified as an optimal solution. This solution consists of Senators Rock-
efeller (Democrat, WV), Sarbanes (Democrat, MD), Thurmond (Republican, SC), Symms
(Republican, ID), and Dole (Republican, KS). Interestingly, none of the maximum-degree
nodes were selected. Similarly, the six most influential senators of the more recent 110th
Congress (January 2007–January 2009) are Kerry (Democrat, MA), Bennett (Republican,
UT), Sessions (Republican, AL), Enzi (Republican, WY), Rockefeller (Democrat, WV),
and Lautenberg (Democrat, NJ).
We also applied our technique to the more recent 112th Congress, using voting data
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Figure 12: A part of the LIG for the 110th U.S. Congress: blue nodes represent Democrat
senators, red Republican, and white independent; darker color of nodes represent higher
threshold (more stubborn); thicker arcs denote influence factors of higher magnitude; circled
node (Senator Rockefeller) denotes one of the most influential senators; rectangles at the
bottom denote cut nodes used in the divide-and-conquer algorithm.
from May 9, 2011 to August 23, 2012. A set of the most influential senators with respect
to the outcome of everyone voting “yes” consists of Senators Reid (Democrat, NV), Inouye
(Democrat, HI), Johnson (Republican, WI), Sanders (Independent, VT), Hagan (Democrat,
NC), Collins (Republican, ME), Crapo (Republican, ID), DeMint (Republican, SC), Reed
(Democrat, RI), and Barrasso (Republican, WY). Note that the set of most-influential
senators in the 112th Congress consists of 10 senators, whereas it consists of only six
senators in the earlier Congresses that we studied. This implies that, according to our
model, for the 112th Congress, we now need a broader group of “influencing” senators
to lead everyone to a consensus. This is consistent with the contemporary perception of
polarization in Congress, which has been highlighted both in the mainstream media and
formal research studies in recent times (Moody and Mucha, 2013).
Besides identifying the most influential senators with respect to passing a bill (e.g.,
the outcome of everyone voting “yes”), we can also apply our model to study the other
extreme of not passing a bill (e.g, the outcome of everyone voting “no”). According to
our model, we can achieve the latter outcome in the 112th Congress if the following 10
senators choose to vote “no”: Senators Nelson (Democrat, FL), Cardin (Democrat, MD),
Klobuchar (Democrat, MN), Reed (Democrat, RI), Murkowski (Republican, AK), Moran
(Republican, KS), Vitter (Republican, LA), Enzi (Republican, WY), Crapo (Republican,
ID), and DeMint (Republican, SC).
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Later on, we will show that besides the desired outcomes of everyone voting “yes”
or everyone voting “no,” our model and approach extend to studying even more general
outcomes, such as breaking filibusters or preventing clotures.
6.4.1 Adapting a Popular Diffusion-Based Algorithm as Heuristic for Most-
Influential-Nodes Problem Instance in LIGs
Our one-shot noncooperative game-theoretic approach is fundamentally different from the
diffusion approach, both syntactically (i.e., mathematical foundations) and semantically
(e.g., interpretation of objectives, nature of problem formulations, and applicable domains
and contexts). Of course, the most obvious key difference is that our solution concept does
not consider dynamics. We concentrate on “end-state” behavior and characterize stable
outcomes using the notion of PSNE, which is “static” by nature. 16 As we reviewed in
Section 2.2, many of the diffusion-based approaches lead to the outcomes that are not
stable. 17
Yet, out of purely scientific curiosity and suggestions/feedback about our work, we
present preliminary results based on a heuristic for the problem of most influential nodes
in our context (i.e., LIGs) that we designed by adapting the arguably most popular and
simple greedy-selection algorithm for identifying “most influential” nodes developed specif-
ically for the cascade model of diffusion (Kleinberg, 2007). The simplicity of the original
algorithm in the diffusion context facilitates the adaptation to our context. Note however
that this adaptation is exclusive to a very specific instance of our general problem formu-
lation: identifying “most influential nodes” with respect to the goal being maximizing the
number of +1’s in the PSNE (see Definition 3.5 in Section 3.2 for a definition and discus-
sion of our problem formulation and the role that the “objective function” g(.) plays in the
formulation.)
We realize that, inspired mostly by the cascade model described in Kleinberg (2007),
the literature on diffusion models for and approaches to problems related to “influence max-
imization” and “minimization” has increased considerably since the early groundbreaking
work of Kempe et al. (2003) and particularly over the last few years. 18 We reemphasize
that all that work uses a diffusion-based approach and thus fundamentally differs from the
work presented here, both in terms of the problem definition and the solution approach. As
a result, comparing the result of such disparate approaches is not scientifically meaningful,
in our view. Furthermore, it would be nontrivial and out-of-scope for this paper to adapt
the techniques used or proposed to solve their specific variations of the “influence maximiza-
tion” or “minimization” problem in a diffusion-based setting, to employ as heuristics to
solve our problem; just as we would not expect adaptations of our techniques as heuristics
16Note that PSNE may, or may not, be reachable by (possibly networked) best-response dynamics.
17The reader should bear in mind that the intention behind our statements contrasting the ap-
proaches/models is simple: to highlight some of the differences. We do not mean to imply that one approach
or model is “better” than the other: they are just different and largely incomparable, each with its own
“pros and cons” depending on the problem, context, or domain of interest. In other words, each has its own
place.
18See, for example, Budak et al. (2011); Chen et al. (2011); He et al. (2012) and the references therein,
for variations of the basic model, problem and techniques. A survey by Guille et al. (2013) also contains
latest developments.
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to solve their problems.
Therefore, in this paper, we only adapt the popular, greedy algorithm used to find the
“most influential individuals” in the cascade model, as described in Kleinberg (2007), to
use as a heuristic to solve what would be the equivalent/analogous instance of that prob-
lem in the more general problem formulation in our setting presented in Section 3.2. That
greedy algorithm, originally meant for the particular cascade model of diffusion, is arguably
the most simple and fundamental of the work in that area. The resulting heuristic corre-
sponds to a very “controlled” version of (possibly networked) best-response dynamics on
the influence game of interest starting from specific initial conditions.
Diffusion-based Heuristic We first note that we use the same influence factors and
thresholds of the previously learned LIGs to perform both of these analyses. In particular,
for the diffusion-based heuristic, at each iteration, we select a node u that achieves the
“maximum spread” of action 1, by which we mean the node u that leads to the largest
(marginal difference in the) number of other players in the network with action 1 after
performing best-response dynamics in the LIG; force u to adopt action 1; and let all but
the previously selected nodes modify their actions as best responses to u’s adoption of
action 1. We repeat this process until every node adopts action 1. 19
Note that because of negative influence factors, cycling may occur and this procedure
may never come to a stop. However, in our case, even in the presence of negative influence
factors, we did not encounter such cycling.
Furthermore, it is well known that the general greedy-selection recipe just described pro-
duces a provable approximation algorithm in the cascade model with submodular spread
function (Kleinberg, 2007). But given the presence of negative influence factors in our LIG
and, more importantly, the fact that we do not even know what the corresponding “sub-
modular spread function” is or means in our setting, this claim of approximation guarantee
essentially vanishes or is irrelevant in our setting.
Results using Diffusion-based Heuristic We can visualize all possible choices of the
most influential nodes that an algorithm can make as a directed acyclic graph, as shown in
Figures 13 and 14.
Although Figure 13 looks more complicated than Figure 14 (due to the appearance of the
same node in different source-sink paths of the dag at different levels), comparing them we
find that, not only a set of six nodes are most-influential in both cases, but also most of the
nodes are common between these two distinct approximation algorithms. More remarkably,
some of these common nodes are selected at the same iteration in both algorithms. The
obvious question arises, is a set of most-influential nodes in the LIG setting, as output
by our approximation algorithm, also a possible output of the diffusion-based heuristic?
We have exhaustively tested all possible sets of the most influential nodes (Figure 13) and
settled the answer in the negative for each set. Interestingly, if we add the “Alexander R
TN” node to any of the most influential sets in the LIG setting, the resulting set can be
the output of the diffusion-based heuristic. The apparent similarity in results between the
19At the end, we also perform a post-processing step, where we try to remove one of the selected nodes
to test if the remaining nodes are still most-influential.
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Brown D OH
Bennett R UT
Sessions R AL
Barrasso R WY Enzi R WY
Carper D DE Inouye D HI Lautenberg D NJ Menendez D NJRockefeller D WV
Lautenberg D NJ Carper D DE 
Kerry D MA
Figure 13: Most-influential nodes in our setting. This directed acyclic graph (dag) illus-
trates all possible options for node selection that our approximation algorithm considers.
A source node represents a node selected in the first iteration and a sink node represents
a node selected in the last step. Any directed path from a source to a sink represents a
sequence of nodes selected in successive iterations by our algorithm. All nodes in the same
level and having the same parent, are tied in an iteration of the algorithm. Also note that
the same node can appear in different paths of the dag at different levels.
output of our approximation algorithm and the diffusion-based heuristic gives rise to an
intriguing open question as to the characterization of the exact connection between these
two seemingly different algorithms for identifying this particular instance (i.e., all players
play 1) of the most-influential problem in our setting.. This open question is beyond the
scope of this paper.
6.5 Filibuster
Beyond predicting stable behavior and identifying the most influential nodes in a network,
we can also use our model to study other interesting aspects of a networked population.
One example is the filibuster phenomenon in the U.S. Congress, where a senator uses his or
her right to hold floor for an indefinite time in an effort to delay the passing of a bill. The
procedure of “cloture,” which refers to gathering a majority of at least 60 votes among the
current 100 senators, can break a filibuster. However, not every possible cloture scenario of
60 or more “yes” votes may be a stable outcome due to influence among the senators. We
call the set of such outcomes that are indeed stable in the sense of PSNE a stable cloture
set.
An interesting general question is whether there exists a small coalition of senators that
can break filibusters. We can think of preventing a filibuster from the democratic or the
republican perspective (i.e., favoring the respective party). Similarly, we can also ask what
in some sense is the opposite question: is there a small coalition of senators that can prevent
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Brown D OH
Carper D DE Inouye D HI Rockefeller D WV
Alexander R TN
Bennett R UT
Barrasso R WY Enzi R WY
Lautenberg D NJ Menendez D NJ
Kerry D MA
Figure 14: Most-influential nodes as output by the diffusion-based heuristic. Each directed
path from a source to a sink represents a sequence of nodes that are most-influential, as
determined by applying the variant of the standard greedy algorithm used for traditional
diffusion models to identify the most influential nodes (described in the main body).
clotures by voting “no?” First, let us us formally define the problem for breaking filibusters;
the formulation of the problem for preventing clotures is similar.
6.5.1 Problem Formulation
Given the set S of all stable outcomes (i.e., PSNE) and a subset of C of these stable
outcomes, find a minimal set T of players such that
T ∈ arg maxV⊂{1,...,n}{|PS(V )| | PS(V ) ⊆ C},
where PS(V ) is the set of PSNE-extensions of the nodes in V playing action 1, i.e.,
PS(V ) = {x | x ∈ S, xi = 1 ∀i ∈ V }.
In words, C is the stable cloture set, consisting of stable outcomes that can prevent a
filibuster (i.e., every PSNE in C contains at least 60 “yes” votes and thus, can induce a
cloture). When we consider the notion of preventing a filibuster in favor of a specific party,
we define C consisting of exactly those PSNE that contain 60 or more “yes” votes (thereby
representing cloture scenarios) and in addition, are supported (through “yes” votes) by the
majority of the senators affiliated with that party. Other definitions are possible, as long
as the stable cloture set C is well-defined.
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Now, we would like to select a minimal set of senators such that C contains the set
PS(V ) of the PSNE-extensions of these senators’ voting “yes” (i.e., their voting “yes” can
only lead to a stable cloture scenario, thereby preventing a filibuster). In addition, we
would also like to achieve a maximum stable-cloture cover ; that is, we wish to achieve the
maximum possible set PS(V ) so that we are able to capture as many of the stable cloture
scenarios as possible. In this formulation, we set up as the objective to select a minimal,
not minimum, set of senators; this keeps the formulation simple by avoiding bicriteria
optimization (minimum set of senators vs. maximum stable-cloture cover). Further note
that adding an extra senator to the set of selected senators can only reduce the stable-cloture
cover because of additional constraints.
The problem formulation above guarantees a nonempty solution T if there exists some
PSNE in C that is not “dominated” by any PSNE in S \ C. Here, a PSNE x dominates
another PSNE y if for every i, yi = 1 =⇒ xi = 1.
6.5.2 A Heuristic
We can modify the approximation algorithm for identifying the most influential nodes,
presented at the end of Section 5, to design a heuristic for the problem formulated above
in the following way. At each iteration, we select a node such that adding it to the set
of already selected nodes minimizes the number of PSNE-extensions of the selected nodes
playing 1 that are in S \ C. If there is a tie among several nodes in this step, then we
can store these nodes in order to explore all solutions that this heuristic can produce. We
stop when the above number of PSNE-extensions within S \ C goes to 0. We then perform
a minimality test by excluding nodes from the selected set of nodes and testing whether
the resulting set can be a solution. Note that although we can select the “best” solution
(in terms of the coverage of C) among the ones found due to ties, this heuristic does not
guarantee an approximation of the maximum coverage of C.
6.5.3 Experimental Results on the 110th Congress
For the 110th Congress, C consists of 15,288 and 10,029 stable cloture scenarios (i.e., PSNE)
with respect to the democratic and republican parties, respectively. Overall, the total num-
ber of stable cloture scenarios is 15,595, and most of these are common in both democratic
and republican cases.
Regarding breaking filibusters with respect to the democratic party, the best solutions
found by the above heuristic are Senators {Brown (D, OH), Roberts (R, KS), and Graham
(R, SC)} and {Kerry (D, MA), Roberts (R, KS), and Graham (R, SC)}, both of which cover
1,500 of the 15,288 stable cloture scenarios. The optimal solutions found by a brute-force
procedure are Senators {Brown (D, OH), Craig (R, ID), and Dole (R, NC)} and {Kerry (D,
MA), Craig (R, ID), and Dole (R, NC)}, both covering 1,728 stable cloture scenarios. With
respect to the republican party, the heuristic gives the following two solutions as the best,
each covering 40 of 10,029 stable cloture scenarios: Seantors {Brown (D, OH), Bennett (R,
UT), and Gregg (R, NH)} and Senators {Kerry (D, MA), Bennett (R, UT), and Gregg (R,
NH)}. The optimal solution for this case is Senators {Bennett (R, UT), Conrad (D, ND),
and Sessions (R, AL)}, which covers 138 stable cloture scenarios.
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We now consider the case of preventing cloture scenarios with respect to the democratic
party; that is, the majority of the senators belonging to the democratic party want to pass
a bill, but cannot gather 60 votes due to some senators voting “no.” To find a small set
of senators whose voting choice of “no” prevents cloture scenarios and potentially leads to
filibusters, we adapt the above heuristic. With respect to the democratic party, there are
295,320 non-cloture stable outcomes (where a majority of the democratic senators voted
“yes,” yet there are fewer than 60 “yes” votes in total). The output of our heuristic matches
the optimal set in this case, which covers 9,681 non-cloture scenarios. If Senators McCain
(R, AZ), McConnell (R, KY), Coburn (R, OK), and Hutchison (R, TX) vote “no” then the
set of PSNE is exactly the set of these 9,681 non-cloture scenarios. In that case, according
to our model, a cloture can never take place in the event of a filibuster.
6.5.4 Application of Another Diffusion-Based Heuristic
We can once again try to adapt the popular greedy-selection algorithm for identifying most-
influential nodes in the cascade model in the diffusion setting to work as another heuristic
for the filibuster problem in our setting. In doing so, we encounter two notable obstacles
that highlight another difference between our approach and that based on diffusion.
First, the notion of stable-cloture cover is not well-defined in the diffusion setting. The
forward recursion mechanism central to diffusion models begins with a set of initial adopters
(those senators selected to vote “yes” in our case) and propagates the effects of behavioral
changes throughout the network until it reaches a steady state (i.e., no change occurs).
However, this mechanism focuses on how the dynamics of behavioral changes evolves, not
on the count of steady states that are consistent with a given set of players being among
the adopters (not necessary early adopters), which is required for stable-cloture covers. In
contrast, the stable-cloture cover is well-defined in our approach.
Second, and most important, even if we allow reversals of actions due to negative in-
fluence factors, forward recursion may produce an unstable outcome (i.e., not a PSNE).
Although Granovetter’s original model precludes this by requiring the initial adopters to
have a threshold of 0 (Granovetter, 1978), subsequent development allows forward recur-
sion to start with a set of initial adopters whose thresholds are not necessarily 0 (Kleinberg,
2007). Next, we illustrate this point using our experimental results.
Per the discussion in the last two paragraphs, in our experimental setting regarding
the diffusion-based heuristic, which, once again, result from our adaptation of the popular
greedy-selection approximation algorithm used for the cascade model in diffusion settings,
we omit the notion of maximum stable-cloture cover and thereby forgo the measure of
goodness of a solution. We only concentrate on finding a set of initial adopters that can
drive the forward recursion process to some stable cloture scenario (i.e., a PSNE in C).
In the following paragraph, we outline our diffusion-based heuristic specifically adapted
for the filibuster problem.
For k = 1, 2, . . ., do the following. For all possible sets of k senators, start forward
recursion with these k senators forced to play 1 all the time and other senators initially
playing −1 (but are permitted to switch between 1 and −1 later on). When a steady state
is reached, verify if there are at least 60 senators who are playing 1 in this state. If this is
the case, then further verify if the k senators who are forced to play 1 are indeed playing
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their best response with respect to others’ actions, which is the condition for the cloture
scenario being stable. Stop iterating over k once you find stable cloture scenarios.
In our problem instances, which contain both positive and negative influence factors, it
is very much possible that forward recursion oscillates indefinitely. However, that did not
happen in our experiments. We tried all possible sets of k ≤ 3 initial adopters, but failed
to reach any cloture scenario (stable or unstable). We then tried all possible quadruplets
of initial adopters. With respect to democratic party, 1,189 different quadruplets led the
forward recursion process to a cloture scenario, but nearly half of these quadruplets (536 to
be exact) led to unstable outcomes. Essentially, those unstable outcomes were due to some
of the initial adopters not playing their best response in voting “yes”—all other nodes were
indeed playing their best response (otherwise, the process would not terminate).
Therefore, beyond just emphasizing the stability of an outcome, the approximation
algorithm based on our approach also captures certain phenomena that the heuristic based
on the traditional approach seems unable to do. As stated earlier, of course, we would need
more research to better understand this discrepancy, and the degree to which it could be
reduced, as well as the effectiveness and potential for improvement of the diffusion-based
heuristic. Such research is beyond the scope of this paper and remains open for future
work.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied influence and stable behavior from a new game-theoretic per-
spective. To that end, we introduced a rich class of games, named influence games, to
capture the core strategic component of complex interactions in a network. We char-
acterized the computational complexity of computing and counting PSNE in LIGs. We
proposed practical, effective heuristics to compute PSNE in such games and demonstrated
their effectiveness empirically. Besides predicting stable behavior, we gave a framework for
computing the most influential nodes and its variants (e.g., identifying a small coalition of
senators that can prevent filibuster). We also gave a provable approximation algorithm for
the most-influential-nodes problem.
Although our models are inspired by decades of research by sociologists, at the heart of
our whole approach is abstracting the complex dynamics of interactions using the solution
concept of PSNE. This allowed us to deal with richer problem instances (e.g., the ones with
negative influence factors) as well as to tread into new problem settings beyond identifying
the most influential nodes. We conclude this paper by outlining several interesting lines of
future work.
First, we leave several computational problems open. We showed that counting the
number of PSNE even in a star-type LIG is #P-complete, but does there exist an FPRAS
for the counting problem? The computational complexity of indiscriminant LIGs, which
we conjecture to be PLS-complete, is unresolved. Also, computing mixed-strategy Nash
equilibria of LIGs, even for special types such as trees, remains an open question.
Second, we can apply our models to the general setting of “strategic interventions,”
where we study the effects of changes in node thresholds, connectivity, or influence factors,
usually without the possibility of having corresponding behavioral data. The following is
an illustrative example of it in the context of the 111th U.S. Congress. After the death of
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Ted Kennedy, who was a democratic senator from the state of Massachusetts, a republican
named Scott Brown was elected in his place. Not only that it was Senator Brown’s first
appointment in Senate, he was also the first republican from Massachusetts to be elected
to Senate for a long time. With no behavioral data available at that point of time, we can
perform interventions using our model under various assumptions of thresholds, connec-
tivity, and influence factors regarding Senator Brown, with the general goal of predicting
stable outcomes and investigating the effects of the above interventions in various settings,
such as filibuster scenarios or the setting of the most influential senators.
Another example of intervention, in the context of the Framingham heart study alluded
in Section 1, is the following. Suppose that we would like to implement a policy of targeted
interventions in order to reduce smoking by some margin. Using our model, we can modify
the thresholds of the selected targets and predict how it could affect the overall level of
smoking.
Besides interventions, we can also use our model to analyze past happenings, such as
the role of the bipartisan “gang-of-six” senators in leading the members of the two major
parties to an agreement during the U.S. debt ceiling crisis. 20 We can use our model to find
how influential the gang-of-six senators were as a group. One approach to this problem
would be to first find the set of stable outcomes consistent with the gang-of-six senators
voting “yes” and then to analyze what fraction of these stable outcomes has 60 or more
“yes” votes (signifying the passing of the corresponding bill without any possibility of a
filibuster).
Our model of influence game can be considered as a step in the direction of modeling
competitive contagion in strategic settings (see, for example, Budak et al. (2011); Goyal and
Kearns (2012)). Here, one of the main challenges would be to formulate the competitive
aspects of multiple “campaigns” without having to go through the usual network dynamics.
In this general setting, we can ask questions such as who are the most influential individuals
with respect to achieving a certain objective that favors one “campaign” as opposed to the
other? Questions like these and many others shape the long-term goal of this research.
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A On the Connection to Rational Calculus Models of Col-
lective Action
The formal study of individual behavior in a collective setting originally began under the
umbrella of “collective behavior” in sociology and social psychology. The classical treat-
ment of collective behavior views individuals in a “crowd” as irrational beings with a lowered
intellectual and reasoning ability. The proposition is that an increased level of suggestibil-
ity among the individuals facilitates the rapid spread of the homogeneous “mind of the
crowd” (Le Bon, 1897; Park and Burgess, 1921; Blumer, 1939). Herbert Blumer’s work,
in particular, popularized the classical theory of collective behavior well beyond academia
and into such domains as police and the armed forces (McPhail, 1991, p. 9). However,
this theory was subjected to much criticism primarily because it did not study empirical
accounts systematically. 21
In response to that, Clark McPhail undertook a massive effort, spanning three decades,
to record the behavior of individuals in collective settings that he calls “gatherings” in
order to distinguish it from (homogeneous) “crowds” in collective behavior (see McPhail
(1991, Ch. 5, 6) for a summary of his two-decade study). His empirical accounts, stored
in a range of media formats as technology improved, reveal one common thing—that a
gathering consists of individuals with diverse objectives, who nevertheless behave rationally
and purposefully. To distinguish this purposive nature of individuals from irrationality in
the classical treatment, he calls his study “collective action” and broadly defines it as “any
activity that two or more individuals take with or in relation to one another” (McPhail,
2007, p. 881). In short, collective action can be seen as the modern approach, as opposed to
the “old” (but not unimportant) approach of collective behavior (Miller, 2000, p. 14–15). 22
Many of the rational calculus or economic choice models that were originally proposed
for collective behavior, are now discussed under collective action due to the purposive
nature of the individuals. Here, we will conduct a very narrow and focused review of the
relevant literature in order to place our model in its proper context. Our review will be
concentrated around Mark Granovetter’s threshold models (Granovetter, 1978), which is
one of the most influential models of collective action to date. Before that, we will briefly
21For instance, Blumer himself referred to this as a “miserable job” by sociologists (Blumer, 1957).
22A brief review of collective behavior and collective action literature is included in Appendix B for
interested readers.
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review two prominent precursors to Granovetter’s models—Schelling’s models of segregation
and Berk’s “gaming” approach.
Schelling’s Models of Segregation
A notable precursor to Granovetter’s threshold models is Nobel-laureate economist Thomas
Schelling’s models of segregation (Schelling, 1971, 1978). Schelling’s models account for seg-
regations that take place as a result of discriminatory individual behavior as opposed to
organized processes (e.g., separation of on-campus residence between graduate and under-
graduate students due to a university’s housing policy) or economic reasons (e.g., segrega-
tion between the poor and the rich in many contexts). An example of a segregation due to
individual choice, or “individually motivated segregation” as Schelling puts it (Schelling,
1971, p. 145), is the residential segregation by color in the U.S. Although Schelling’s models
expressly focus on this case, these can be applied to many other scenarios as well.
In Schelling’s spatial proximity model, if an individual’s level of tolerance for population
of the opposing type is exceeded in his neighborhood, he moves to another spatial location
where he can be “happy.” Schelling studied the dynamics of segregation in this model
using a rule of movement for the “unhappy” individuals. The bounded-neighborhood model
is concerned with one global neighborhood. An individual enters it if it satisfies its level
of tolerance constraint and leaves it otherwise. Schelling studies the stability of equilibria
and the tipping phenomenon in this model when the distribution of tolerances and the
population ratio of the two types are varied. An important finding is that in the cases
studied, the modal level of tolerance does not correspond to a tipping point. 23
Berk’s “Gaming” Approach
Another notable precursor to Granovetter’s models is Berk’s rational calculus approach
(Berk, 1974). Berk strongly criticizes the assumption of individual irrationality which
became prevalent in collective behavior literature. He formulates his approach by first
giving a detailed empirical account of an anti-war protest at Northwestern University that
originated in a town-hall meeting addressing dormitory rent hike. 24 He explains individual
decision making through Raiffa’s decision theory principles.
To motivate his approach, he first notes that participating individuals in that protest
were diverse in their disposition and that they exercised their reasoning power. He then
broadly classifies the participants into two types—militants (with the desired action of
trashing properties) and moderates (with the desired action of an anti-war activity, but
not trashing). Each participant, militant or moderate, estimates the support in favor of his
disposition, and with enough support, he will “act” (e.g., trash properties if he is militant).
Clearly, an individual’s estimate of support directly affects his “payoff.” If an individual
estimates that there is not enough support to act in favor of his disposition, he can try to
persuade others to support his disposition so that he can receive a higher payoff by being
able to act. This can be translated as an attempt to change others’ payoff matrices, which
23More on Schelling’s models can be found in Appendix B.
24Berk’s description gives accounts of both mundane and exciting happenings during the course of the
protest and is recognized as “among the best in the literature” (McPhail, 1991, p. 126).
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is facilitated by the milling phase when they communicate and negotiate with each other.
The milling phase ends when a consensus or a compromise is reached and becomes common
knowledge. In this way, a concerted action takes place according to Berk’s model.
Granovetter’s Threshold Models
Granovetter (1978) presented his threshold models in the setting of a crowd, where each
individual is deciding whether to riot or not. In the simplest setting, each individual has
a threshold and his decision is influenced by the decisions of others—if the number (or the
proportion) of individuals already rioting is below his threshold, then he remains inactive,
otherwise he engages in rioting. The emphasis is on investigating equilibrium outcomes due
to the process of forward recursion (Granovetter, 1978, p. 1426), given a distribution of
the thresholds of the population. It may be mentioned here that forward recursion starts
only if there is an individual with a threshold of 0.
Granovetter’s models are inspired by Schelling’s models of segregation. In fact, one
can draw a parallel between Schelling’s level of tolerance and Granovetter’s threshold in
the following way. In Schelling’s models, an individual leaves a neighborhood if his level
of tolerance is exceeded, whereas in Granovetter’s models, an individual becomes active in
rioting if his threshold is exceeded. Furthermore, in both models, dynamics is of utmost
importance and serves the purpose of explaining how an equilibrium collective outcome
emerges from individual behavior. However, apart from these similarities, these two models
are semantically different and also focus on completely different outlooks. First, Granovetter
ascribes a deeper meaning to the concept of threshold. Threshold of an individual is not
just “a number that he carries with him” from one situation to another (Granovetter, 1978,
p. 1436). It rather depends on the situation in question and can even vary within the
same situation due to changes occurring in it. Second, in Granovetter’s models, a very
small perturbation in the distribution of population threshold may lead to sharply different
equilibrium outcomes. Granovetter highlights this property of his models as an explanation
of seemingly paradoxical outcomes that goes against the predispositions of the individuals.
Two features of Granovetter’s models make it stand out among the rational calculus
models. First, the models are capable of capturing scenarios beyond the classical realm
of collective behavior. Granovetter begins by setting up his model to complement the
emergent norm theory (see Appendix B) by providing an explicit model of how “individual
preferences interact and aggregate” to form a new norm (Granovetter, 1978, p. 1421).
Not only that such an explicit model eliminates the need for implicit assumptions (such
as a new norm emerges when the majority of the population align themselves with that
norm), it can also capture paradoxical outcomes alluded above that cannot be captured by
the implicit assumption on the majority. Beyond the emergent norm theory, Granovetter’s
models can capture a wide range of phenomena that do not fall within the classical realm of
collective behavior, such as diffusion of innovation, voting, public opinion, and residential
segregation, to name a few. The second prominent feature of Granovetter’s models is
its ease of adaptation when dealing with a networked population. The same mechanism
of forward recursion is applicable when the underlying influence structure is specified by a
“sociomatrix,” which accounts for how much an individual influences another (Granovetter,
1978, p.1429). This is particularly useful for studying collective action in the setting of a
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social network.
Criticism of Rational Calculus Models
An implicit assumption regarding Granovetter’s sociomatrix is that the elements of the
matrix are non-negative. Otherwise, the process of forward recursion may never terminate,
even on the simplest of examples. However, many real world scenarios do exhibit co-
existence of both positive and negative influences. For the most part, democrat senators
in the U.S. Congress influence their republicans colleagues negatively, while they influence
colleagues of their own party positively. In residential segregation involving more than
two types of individuals, an individual is negatively influenced, in different magnitudes, by
individuals belonging to other types. Clearly, such a situation cannot be modeled using a
non-negative sociomatrix. Furthermore, if we take a second look at Berk’s account, militant
individuals positively reinforce each other in their decision to engage in trashing properties,
whereas their decision is negatively affected by the moderates (that is, the presence of too
many moderates makes it risky for militants to engage in violent action).
Critiques of rational calculus models point out the lack of behavioral adjustment in a
“negative feedback” fashion (McPhail, 2007, p. 883). Here, negative feedback is defined in
the context of the perceptual control theory that lays the foundation of McPhail’s sociocy-
bernetics theory of collective action (see Appendix B). In a negative feedback system, an
individual can adjust his behavior depending on the discrepancy between the input signal
and the desired signal (the sign of this discrepancy has no correlation to negative feedback).
In contrast, in a positive feedback system, such control of behavior is not possible. A typ-
ical example of a positive feedback system is a chemical chain reaction. An analogue to
this is the “domino effect” cited often in rational calculus models (Granovetter, 1978, p.
1424). It is true that rational calculus models neither accounts for “errors” as desired by the
proponents of the sociocybernetics theory, nor is it well-defined in the context of rational
calculus. But it is not the case that “reversal” of behavior, which can be thought of as a
crude form of behavioral adjustment, is precluded in rational calculus models. Such a form
of behavioral adjustment can certainly be incorporated by allowing negative elements in
the sociomatrix, but the challenge lies in the forward recursion process which may oscillate
indefinitely because of those negative elements.
B Brief Review of Collective Behavior and Collective Action
in Sociology
In sociology, the umbrella of collective behavior is very broad and encompasses an incredi-
bly rich set of models explaining various aspects of a wide range of social phenomena such
as revolutions, movements, riots, strikes, disaster, panic, and diffusion of innovations (e.g.,
fashion, adopting contraceptives, electronic gadgets, or even religion), just to name a few. 25
Sociologists Marx and McAdam, in their concise introductory book on collective behavior
25In fact, the richness of just one subfield of collective behavior, termed micro-level theories of collective
behavior, led Montgomery to comment in his book (Montgomery, 1999, p. 67), “The variety of theories
focusing on the micro level is confusing, but is an indication of the complexity and variations in the process
by which movements emerge or perhaps fail to emerge...”
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(Marx and McAdam, 1994), contend that unlike many other fields of sociology, the field of
collective behavior is not easy to define, partly because of the varied opinion of scholars:
from very narrow perspectives, to such wide, all-encompassing perspectives (e.g., Robert
Park and Herbert Blumer’s) that virtually eliminates the need to have collective behavior as
an individual field in sociology. 26 Yet, Marx and McAdam point out the traditional dispo-
sition to categorize collective behavior as a “residual field” in sociology; that is, the study of
collective behavior consists of those elements of behavior (e.g., fads, fashion, crazes), orga-
nization (e.g., social movement), group (e.g., crowd), individual (e.g., psychological states
such as panic), etc., that do not readily fit into well-established and commonly observed so-
cial structures. Similarly, collective behavior is defined in Goode’s textbook (Goode, 1992,
p. 17) as the “relatively spontaneous, unstructured, extrainstitutional behavior of a fairly
large number of individuals.”
Classical Treatment of Collective Behavior: Mass Hysteria
The classical treatment of collective behavior views individuals in a crowd as non-rational,
transformed into hysteria by the collective environment. The central tenet of the early work
of Gustave Le Bon’s is that individuals in a crowd share a “mind of the crowd,” and that
the “psychological law of the mental unity of crowds” guides their psychological state and
behavior in the collective setting (Le Bon, 1897, p. 5). In Le Bon’s account, an individual
in a crowd may retain some of the ordinary characteristics he shows in isolation; but
the emphasis is on the extraordinary characteristics that emerge only in a crowd because
of “a sentiment of invincible power,” contagion, and most importantly, the susceptivity
of individuals to take suggestions as if they were hypnotic subjects. Examples of such
extraordinary characteristics of a crowd are “impulsiveness,” “incapacity to reason,” and
“the absence of judgment,” to name a few (Le Bon, 1897, p. 16). In sum, individuals in a
crowd are depleted of their intellectual capacity and become uniform in their psychological
state. This leads the crowd to an identical direction of collective behavior that may be heroic
or criminal, depending on the type of “hypnotic suggestion” alluded above (although Le
Bon gives examples of heroic crowds (Le Bon, 1897, p. 14), for the most part, he tends to
give “crowds” a negative connotation).
Le Bon’s work influenced around half-a-century of subsequent developments. Park and
Burgess upheld his proposition on the transformation of individuals in a crowd. They
put forward the concept of circular reaction (Park and Burgess, 1921), later refined by
Herbert Blumer (Blumer, 1939). Circular reaction refers to a reciprocal process of social
interaction that explains how crowd members become uniform in their behavior, something
that Le Bon could not really explain. In this process, an individual’s behavior stimulates
another individual to behave alike; and when the latter individual does so, it reinforces
the stimulation that the former individual acted upon. In circular reaction, individuals do
not act rationally or intellectually; that is, they do not reason about the action of others,
but instead, they only align themselves with the behavior of others. This is different from
interpretative interaction, another mechanism that Blumer defined to explain routine group
26Quoting from their book, “The field of collective behavior is like the elephant in Kipling’s fable of the
blind persons and the elephant. Each person correctly identifies a separate part, but all fail to see the whole
animal.”
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behavior (e.g., a group of individuals shopping in a mall), as opposed to collective behavior
(e.g., social movement). In interpretative interaction, individuals react (perhaps differently)
to their interpretation of others’ action, not the action itself. Therefore, in interpretative
interaction, one can treat individuals as rational beings. 27
In Blumer’s account, a crowd goes through several well-defined stages before a collec-
tive behavior finally emerges. The three underlying mechanisms that facilitate transitions
among these stages are circular reaction, collective excitement, and social contagion; one
can roughly think of collective excitement as a more intense form of circular reaction, and
of social contagion as an even more intense form of circular reaction (McPhail, 1991, p.
11). 28
Emergent Norm Theory
Although Blumer’s account of collective behavior received wide-spread acceptance, even
beyond academia (McPhail, 1991, p. 9), others deemed many of the underlying assumptions
in it, as well as in the general mass-hysteria theory, unrealistic. Arguably, individuals
with different objectives in mind participate in a collective behavior, and one can observe
changes in their individual behavior throughout the process of a collective behavior too. 29
Therefore, the assumption of complete uniformity behavior in the classical mass-hysteria
treatment is very much a stretch. Furthermore, the assumption of hysteric crowd in the
classical approach has also been called into question. One notable critique of the mass-
hysteria theory comes from Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian (Turner and Killian, 1957).
They view individuals in a crowd as behaving under normative constraints and showing
“differential expression.” However, a new norm emerges when the established norms of the
society cannot adequately guide a crowd facing an extraordinary situation. They call this
the emergent norm and contend that it is the emergent norm that gives the “illusion of
unanimity.”
Collective Action
The goal-oriented nature of collective behavior was further highlighted by sociologists study-
ing social movements during the 1970s and 80s. In order to distinguish their approach from
the traditional approach to collective behavior, dominated by the assumption of irrational
27For clarity of presentation, we differentiate between routine group behavior and collective behavior. To
the contrary, Blumer, as well as Park in his earlier work, viewed collective behavior as encompassing a wide
range of social phenomena, including routine group behavior. Within the continuum of collective behavior
in Blumer’s view, the presence or the absence of rationality of individuals earmarks two distinct mechanisms
named interpretative interaction and circular reaction, respectively.
28The mechanism of “social contagion” as defined by Blumer or the “social contagion theory” (Locher,
2001, p. 11) in general should not to be confused with the term “social contagion” that computer scientists
use (Ugander et al., 2012). Although both have their roots in epidemics, in the former case, individuals are
transformed into being more suggestible, which facilitates “rapid, unwitting, and non-rational dissemination”
of behavior (Blumer, 1939); whereas in the latter case, individuals act rationally.
29We refer the reader to (Miller, 2000, p. 26–27) for a beautiful example in the context of the 1967
anti-war demonstration in Washington, DC, which was participated by nearly 250,000 people. While many
of the participants might have been there to genuinely voice their opinion against the war, some might have
been looking for “excitement, drug, or sex.” Yet again, individuals playing different roles, such as protest
leaders, street vendors, and the police, behaved differently.
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and aimless nature of crowds, they used the term collective action to mean “people acting
together in pursuit of common interests” (Tilly, 1978). Strikingly, based on a series of
systematic observations, Clark McPhail’s contends that the goal-oriented nature of crowds
is not limited to social movements and revolutions alone, but is a feature of various other
types of crowds. In his book the Myth of the Madding Crowd, he uses two decades of em-
pirical observations pertaining to a multitude of crowd settings to formulate a theory of
collective behavior now recognized as a significant paradigm shift (McPhail, 1991, Ch. 5,
6). To distance himself from the term “crowds,” which has already gained several meanings
depending on whose theory is being considered, he gives his formulation in the setting of
“gatherings.” But first, he places a justifiably strong emphasis on the definition of collective
behavior. His “working definition of collective behavior” is the study of “two or more per-
sons engaged in one or more behaviors (e.g., locomotion, ...) judged common or concerted
on one or more dimensions (e.g., direction, velocity, ...)” 30 (McPhail, 1991, p. 159).
The broad nature of McPhail’s definition of collective behavior, although based on ex-
tensive empirical evidence, did not receive immediate acceptance. Even modern textbooks
on collective behavior try to conserve the classical appeal of collective behavior. 31 Perhaps
to further distance himself from the traditional viewpoint, McPhail later began to use the
term collective action instead of collective behavior (for example, in a recent encyclope-
dia article, McPhail refers to the above mentioned definition as that of collective action
(McPhail, 2007)). According to David Miller, the modern view on the distinction between
collective action and collective behavior is beyond simply terminological. Collective action
is given the status of a “new” theory in sociology, while collective behavior is marked as
“old,” but not unimportant. (Miller, 2000, p. 14–15). 32
McPhail’s approach to collective action is known as the social behavioral interactionist
(SBI) approach. As much as it agrees with the emergent-norm theory, in terms of the
diversity of individual objectives in a collective setting, it does not agree with the concept
of an emergent norm suppressing this diversity. The SBI approach studies gatherings in
three phases of its life cycle: the assembling process, collective action within the assembled
gathering, and the dispersal process (McPhail, 1991, p. 153). Although each of these
three phases is rich and interdependent, the goal is to manage the complexity of collective
action as a whole by focusing on the recognizable parts of it. Interestingly, the underlying
mechanism to explain collective action is drawn from the perceptual control theory (McPhail,
1991, Ch. 6). McPhail adapts this theory to formulate his sociocybernetics theory of
collective action. In brief, an individual receives sensory inputs, compares the input signal
to its desired signal, 33 and adjusts its behavior in response to the discrepancy. The behavior
30Note that it is the “behavior,” not a specific action, that needs to be common or concerted. For example,
when a group of people are chatting together, their behavior is concerted, even though they are not speaking
identical words.
31For example, in reference to McPhail’s definition, Goode writes in his textbook, “In the view of most
observers, myself included, many gatherings are not sites of collective behavior (most casual and conventional
crowds, for example), and much collective behavior does not take place in gatherings of any size (the behavior
of most masses and publics, for example)” (Goode, 1992, p. 17). Ironically, this is the very viewpoint that
McPhail seeks to portray as a myth.
32Miller also points out that sociology textbooks are likely to talk about collective behavior only, whereas
recent journal articles talk about collective action only.
33In contrast to engineering control systems theory, the desired signal is not external, but set by individuals
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of individuals affects the “environment,” which in turn affects the input signal, thereby
completing a loop. An important aspect of this theory is that various external factors
(or “disturbances”) may drive an individual to make different behavioral adjustments at
different points in time even if the discrepancy between the input signal and the desired
signal remains the same.
Additional Notes on Schelling’s Models
Schelling’s models assume that individuals behave in a discriminatory way. For example,
individuals are aware, consciously or unconsciously, about the types of other individuals in
their neighborhood and behave (i.e., stay in the neighborhood or leave) according to their
preference. This is different from organized processes (e.g., separation of on-campus resi-
dence between graduate and undergraduate students due to a university’s housing policy)
or economic reasons (e.g., segregation between the poor and the rich in many contexts)
(Schelling, 1971, 1978). An example of a segregation due to individual choice, or “individ-
ually motivated segregation” as Schelling puts it (Schelling, 1971, p. 145), is the residential
segregation by color in the United States. In fact, Schelling’s models and their analyses
expressly focus on this case. Yet, we can apply Schelling’s theory to many other scenar-
ios as well. This is because it explains, at an abstract level, how collective outcomes are
shaped from individual choice. We note here that connecting individual actions to collective
outcomes is a mainstream theme of research in collective action.
Schelling introduces two basic models to study the dynamics of segregation among in-
dividuals of two different types (Schelling, 1971). In the first model, the spatial proximity
model, individuals are initially positioned in a spatial configuration (such as a line or a
stylized two-dimensional area) and individuals of the same type share a common “level
of tolerance.” This level of tolerance quantifies the upper limit on the percentage of an
individual’s opposite type in his local neighborhood that he can put up with. Here, we
define an individual’s local neighborhood with respect to the individual’s position in the
specified spatial configuration. In this model, we use a rule of movement for the “unhappy”
individuals to study the dynamics of segregation. For example, an individual whose level of
tolerance has been exceeded, moves to the closest location where the tolerance constraint
can be satisfied. Assuming an equal number of individuals of each type and a fixed local
neighborhood size, Schelling first studies how clusters evolve from the initial configura-
tion of a random placement of the individuals on a straight line. He then generalizes the
experimentation by varying different model parameters such as neighborhood size, level of
tolerance, and the ratio of individuals of the two types. Notable findings are that decreasing
the local neighborhood size leads to a decrease in the average cluster size and that for an
unequal number of individuals of the two types, decreasing the relative size of the minority
leads to an increase in the average minority cluster size.
Schelling extends this experimentation to a different setting of a two-dimensional checker-
board. The individuals are randomly distributed on the squares of the checkerboard, leav-
ing some of the squares unoccupied. An individual’s local neighborhood is defined by the
squares around it and an unhappy individual moves to the “closest” unoccupied square
(leaving its original square unoccupied) that can satisfy its tolerance constraint. In ad-
themselves (which is also highlighted by the term cybernetics).
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dition to studying clustering properties by varying different model parameters, two new
classes of individual preferences have been studied: congregationist and integrationist. In a
congregationist preference, an individual only wants to have at least a certain percentage of
neighbors of its own type and does not care about the presence of individuals of the oppo-
site type in its neighborhood. Experiments show that even when each individual is happy
being a minority in its neighborhood (e.g., having three neighbors of its own type out of
eight), the dynamics of segregation leads to a configuration as if the individuals wished to
be majority in their neighborhoods. In an integrationist preference, individuals have both
an upper and a lower limit on the level of tolerance. The dynamics is much more complex
in this case and leads to clusters of unoccupied squares.
Schelling’s second model, the bounded-neighborhood model, concerns one global neigh-
borhood. An individual enters it if it satisfies its level of tolerance constraint and leaves
it otherwise. The level of tolerance is no longer fixed for each type and the distribution
of tolerances among individuals of each type is given. The emphasis is on the stability of
equilibria as the distribution of tolerances and the population ratio of the two types vary.
For example, under a certain linear distribution of tolerances and a population ratio of
2 : 1, there exist only two stable equilibria, each consisting of individuals of one type only;
whereas a mixture of individuals of both types can arise as a stable equilibrium under a
different setting. This model has been adapted to study tipping phenomenon, with one
notable constraint; that is, the capacity of the neighborhood is fixed. An example of a tip-
ping phenomenon is when a neighborhood consisting of only one type of individuals is later
inhabited by some individuals of the opposite type and as a result, the entire population
of the original type evacuates the neighborhood. An important finding is that in the cases
studied, the modal level of tolerance does not correspond to a tipping point.
C Experimental Results in Tabular Form
Table 2 shows experimental data of PSNE computation on uniform random directed graphs.
Of particular interest is the result that the number of PSNE usually increases when the flip
probability p is increased, i.e., when the number of arcs with negative influence factors is
increased.
Table 3 illustrates the experimental result that the logarithmic-factor approximation
algorithm for identifying the most influential individuals performs very well in practice.
Finally, Table 4 shows the influence factors and thresholds of the LIG among the U.S.
Supreme Court justices, which are learned using the U.S. Supreme Court dataset.
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Table 2: PSNE computation on uniform random directed graphs. Offsets of 95% confidence
intervals are shown in parenthesis.
p # of equilibria # of node visits/equilibrium Avg CPU time (sec) for
Avg (95% CI) Avg (95% CI) computing all equilibria
0.00 2.18 (0.16) 35379.73 (3349.77) 1.81
0.125 3.72 (0.50) 22756.15 (2673.56) 1.57
0.25 13.00 (1.92) 9796.30 (1748.76) 1.9
0.375 19.42 (2.88) 7380.97 (1870.11) 1.95
0.50 14.40 (2.17) 9826.61 (1696.52) 2.04
0.625 19.78 (3.40) 8167.60 (1450.48) 2.07
0.75 28.76 (4.34) 6335.18 (1963.11) 2.21
0.875 67.14 (9.52) 4064.06 (1539.33) 3.27
1.00 194.96 (28.47) 1879.45 (235.90) 5.23
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